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#### Plan: The United States federal government should normalize its trade relations with Cuba.

#### Contention 1 is Multilateralism

#### Reliance on unilateralism will collapse US leadership and cause global wars with weapons of mass destruction

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Unilateralism is the wrong approach for American Diplomacy. There is nothing to suggest its efficacy since 9/11. There is nothing to suggest its usefulness for future conflict. In allowing the US to go it alone, America's partners and allies risk the havoc and catastrophic consequences that will accompany "Imperial Overstretch." The residue of overstretch will include loss of US leadership in the world, an economy whose decline affects billions of dollars in international markets, and certainly emboldens rogue states. The whole world will pay the price if we let unilateralism pervade this century. As the bloodiest 100 years in recorded history, the 20th Century is replete with examples of how policy and practice intersect to foment war. The proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and the constantly mutating dynamic of terrorism inform our current, dangerous reality. Amidst this backdrop of destruction, there are lessons for those who are looking for them. Seeds of peacemaking and conflict resolution were planted which we must germinate in order to halt and then reverse the trend toward violence and chaos. Perhaps the 21st Century could be the first 100 years in which nations invest more in building peace than in making war. In the 20th Century, local conflicts ignited global tensions and genocide on an unprecedented scale, costing incalculable life and treasure. The two world wars and other explosive conflicts erupted over such issues as ethnic disputes, the securing of natural resources, corporate interests, ideology and religion. The international business of war produced economies of scale prompted by the industrial, technological, and communications revolutions. The assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria and his wife in Sarajevo by anarchist Gavrilo Princip was the spark that ignited WWI. In time, some 15 million people would be killed. The sheer brutality of that war led Woodrow Wilson to issue his "Fourteen Points" in 1918, which included the establishment of a League of Nations "for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike." Just like our present-day difficulties in pursuing compromise, the US Congress politicized the concept, bucked the President, and did not support that initiative. The subsequent failure of the League of Nations to prevent WWII may have galvanized our culture's distrust of multilateralism. Throughout the 20th Century and until today, nations and other entities have invested precious financial, intellectual, social, institutional and political capital into arming themselves with weaponry, instead of building their capacity for peace. Technologies change and improve with increasing rapidity, but those advances have included improvements in how to kill more people more efficiently and with smaller devices. WWII was the shining example of multilateralism and its power. Vietnam and Korea were examples of its limitations. South Africa and India demonstrated that the support of the international community could enable countries to pull themselves up by their own bootstraps. All these contribute and form the basis of the state of nations today. The 20th Century left us at a crossroads: will we perpetuate the machinery and culture of war or surpass our greatest dreams by encouraging and enforcing peace policies and practices worldwide? The 21st Century began ominously with the attacks of September 11, 2001, which ushered in a new era of US foreign policy and global response to war, conflict and terrorism. Rather than engage a sympathetic world in developing multilateral and inclusive strategies similar to the precursors to the 2003 Iraq War and as was done before the Persian Gulf War, the US squandered its global capital to pursue "pre-emptive" unilateral military action. The equal and increasingly matching reaction is a global culture of military aggression and war. The resulting disintegration of the international community contributed to the most serious economic disaster since the Great Depression. Already struggling to survive amidst broken economies, the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and global terrorism strains multilateralism when it should embolden it. If it is true that every weapon invented is eventually used, we have much to fear if we do not reverse this lethal trend. Since national conflicts frequently spill over into regional and world-wide conflict, multilateral organizations have been very strong supporters of Truth and Reconciliation Commissions. Even the US found a way to first investigate and then come to terms with its terrible policy of putting Japanese-Americans in internment camps during WWII and apologized and paid reparations to survivors and their children. There were important Truth and Reconciliation Commissions in South Africa, supported by the international community. Victims and perpetrators of Apartheid who participated in Truth and Reconciliation Commissions demonstrated in compelling ways the healing and restorative power of those gatherings. Perhaps more importantly, they showed the world that a nonviolent response to unthinkable oppression and injustice can foster the peaceful development of a society intent upon making amends for the past and embarking upon a brighter, shared future. Since conflict-resolution and peacemaking at the local or national level work, why not apply it multilaterally? Concerned about the resurgence of unilateralism in the US's current Marjeh and Kandahar operations in Afghanistan, former Assistant Secretary of State Gene Dewey recently noted that "it's been very lonely being a leading multilateralist in Washington over the last nine years. Too few policy-makers have sensed where our unilateralism has led, and is leading." Saudi Arabia and other authoritarian Islamic countries generated the seeds that not only birthed the terrorists who carried out 9/11, but also attacks in Madrid, London, Mumbai and Chechnya. No matter where terrorists are determined to attempt to disrupt the lives of others, it's time for countries to realize that the only way to confront contemporary terrorism is through multilateralism. This must be a multilateralism that is thoroughly infused with peacemaking and conflict-resolution, instead of only "joint forces." At this crossroads, we can use the knowledge economy, social network and the international community to turn the rhetoric of hope into reality. We sit upon an historical precipice of policies and practices of sustainable, culturally responsive peace-building and violence prevention within and beyond our borders. Despite their faults, the institutions set up after in response to WWII (UN) and the Cold War (NATO) can be the 21st Century's vehicles for peace. We can use those instruments of multilateralism to build the peacekeeping, disaster relief, and conflict resolution forces that bring countries together. "Actually, I believe we have strategically shifted from that of a global war on terror (GWOT) to containing violent extremism (CVE). That said, the reason extremists do what they do is because they recruit from amongst the most desperate people on the earth. And, the reasons for desperation are strategic---but not necessarily military in nature. In fact,we have the capability to wage peace that is just as sophisticated as our capability to make war. Water, AIDS, mass migration of people, desertification, poverty, hunger, and disease---What would happen if our National Security Strategy became a multilateral one of economic engagement, and used the brain power and resources available to mitigate these issues?" -- Lt. Col. Matthew Canfield, U.S. Army (Currently on his second tour in Iraq) Concerns over economic stability, limited resources and security have divided us. Now is the time to create rather than divide common ground.

#### Unilateralism is unsustainable and drives allies away – multilateralism promotes band-wagoning and international coalitions, strengthening the US-led system

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It is misguided, however, to assume that America's preponderant power, when combined with an assertive unilateralism, promotes stability as a matter of course. As the record of the past four years makes clear, the unfettered exercise of U.S. primacy has not led to deference and bandwagoning, but to resentment and incipient balancing. The problem is not unipolarity per se, but changes in the exercise of U.S. power that have in turn changed foreign perceptions of U.S. intentions and how the United States will use its preponderant strength. A dominant America that reassures others and deploys its power to secure public goods induces systemic stability; unfettered primacy deployed in the exclusive pursuit of national self-interest does the opposite.

The Bush Administration's grand strategy rests on a second geopolitical misconception: that U.S. primacy is durable. To be sure, America's economic and military might ensures that it will remain the world's leading nation for decades to come. But current power asymmetries will inevitably diminish in the years ahead. The European Union's wealth already rivals that of the United States, and it may well forge a more independent and unified security policy as this decade proceeds. Over the course of the next decade, Japan may tire of always following America's lead, China will emerge as a major power, and Russia, India and Brazil are poised to become stronger and more assertive players. It will be impossible for the United States to sustain current power, asymmetries. Indeed, if America seeks to preserve unipolarity and its attendant sway over global affairs, it will only ensure that other centers of power, as they rise, array their strength against the United States.

Finally, the Bush Administration has overestimated the advantages of military superiority and mistaken brute strength for influence, producing adverse consequences on a number of fronts. In Iraq, Washington was correct that Saddam Hussein's regime would crumble under the U.S. onslaught, but it failed to appreciate that the invasion would spawn a dangerous mix of nationalism and religious extremism, leaving the United States struggling against a guerrilla insurgency that effectively neutralized America's military might. In similar fashion, the Bush Administration is aware that its unilateralist bent has provoked **anti-American sentiment** in many quarters, but it has discounted the discontent because countries opposed to U.S. policy do not have the military wherewithal to stand in America's way.

Although it is correct that other countries are not forming alliances against the United States, Washington is overlooking the more subtle forms of balancing that are occurring--with potent geopolitical consequence. The broad coalition that blocked UN authorization of the Iraq War denied the United States the legitimacy of international approval, substantially raising the economic and political costs of the war. Allies bore **90 percent of the costs** of the Gulf War, but the American taxpayer has financed most of the current operation, and Washington has been unable to convince key allies to send troops to Iraq. If the United States continues on its current course, it will enjoy military supremacy, but little else.

FROM THE perspective of liberal realism, management of the global balance of power would be based on three propositions. First, the United States must wield its superior strength in concert with others to ensure that it forestalls rather than invites balancing behavior. Re-establishing America's bona tides as a benign hegemon necessitates resuscitating the alliances, institutions and consultations that have eroded under Bush's watch. The United States should of course reserve the fight to act alone as a last resort, hut Washington must rediscover that the costs of unilateral action usually far exceed the costs of seeking consensus.

Second, liberal realism entails moving with--rather than against--the secular diffusion of global power. The scope of American primacy will wane as this century progresses; the ultimate objective should be to channel rising centers of strength into cooperative partnerships with the United States. Furthermore, strength elsewhere, even if it comes at the expense of America's relative power, need not come at the expense of its influence and security. If rising centers of power are integrated into a rule-based order, they promise to be net contributors to international stability. Americans would benefit substantially from a Europe that is capable of projecting power outside its neighborhood and sharing risks and responsibilities with the United States. China is emerging as one of Asia's dominant states; what is in question is not whether its power will rise, but the ends to which it will use its growing strength.

Third, liberal realism rests on a multidimensional understanding of power, sensitive to the fact that America's military supremacy, although a vital element of national strength, is not sufficient to safeguard American security. The United States should continue to invest in its armed forces and maintain its pronounced military advantage, but absent respect for U.S. leadership abroad, U.S. primacy does more to divide the world than to unite it. Washington needs to renew the non-military dimensions of its global influence, working to reclaim its moral authority abroad and to make disaffected allies again feel like stakeholders in the international system.

#### US leadership is unsustainable without a highly visible commitment to multilateralism

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The safeguarding of US authority requires multilateralism that is broader and certainly deeper than in the 1990s—more like NATO than the ad hoc coalitions of the new world order. Indeed, absent the constraints exerted by competition with the Soviet Union, the institutional fetters through which the United States must bind its own hands will have to be even stronger than those in NATO. 47 The great paradox of contemporary international politics is that the unprecedented international power of the United States requires even more binding constraints on its policy is fit to preserve the authority that it has built over the last half-century and extend it to new areas of the globe. The advanced military capabilities of the United States will make it a key actor in any such multilateral institution and will allow it to set the collective agenda. Since it is highly unlikely that anything will happen in the absence of US involvement, as in Bosnia where the Europeans dithered until the United States stepped to the fore, 48 Americans need not be overly concerned about “runaway” organizations or global mission creep. At the same time, if any organization is to be an effective restraint on the United States, other countries will have to make serious and integral contributions to the collective effort. Both sides to this new multilateral bargain will need to recognize and appreciate the benefits of a stable international order to their own security and prosperity and contribute to its success - 480 Making America Safe for the World. The United States will need to continue to play a disproportionate role in providing international order, even as it accepts new restraints on its freedom of action. Other countries, however, must also contribute to the provision of this political order so that they can provide a meaningful check on US authority. Americans are likely to resist the idea of tying their hands more tightly in a new multilateral compact. After six decades, US leadership and its fruits— security, free trade, economic prosperity—have developed a taken-for-granted quality. It is hard for average Americans to tally the myriad benefits they receive from the country’s position of authority, but it is relatively easy for them to see multilateral institutions constraining the country’s freedom of action. Precisely because unipolarity makes coercion and unilateralism possible, and for some attractive, any constraints on US foreign policy may appear too high a price to bear. 49 But if the United States is to remain the leader of the free world and possibly beyond, it must make its authority safe for others. To sustain US authority over the long term, it must be embedded in new, more constraining multilateral institutions. Americans trust their government only because of its internal checks and balances. Although there may be disagreements on exactly where the appropriate scope of government authority ends, nearly all Americans agree that limited government is the best form of government. This same principle extends abroad. If the United States is to exercise authority over other states, and enjoy its fruits, that authority must be checked and balanced as well. The height of hubris is not that the United States might govern the world, at least in part. This is a fact of international politics. Rather, hubris arises in the belief that the virtue of its people and leaders will restrain the United States sufficiently such that other peoples will voluntarily cede a measure of their sovereignty to it. 50 Politicians and peoples may occasionally be saintly, but it would be folly to rely on this quality at home or abroad. Recognizing the universal need to restrain authority, the United States should, in its own self-interest, lead the way to a new world order.

#### First, repeal would represent a commitment to multilateralism for the international community

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In addition, the US needs to improve its international human rights reputation which was severely damaged by US engagements in Iraq and the treatment of prisoners in Guantanamo. The perception that the US does not do its utmost to fully respect international law is an issue that renders difficult joint efforts to make the UN a meaningful instrument for acting decisively against human rights violations.2 If the US wants to act more effectively in multilateral forums in general on human rights matters, Washington, as a matter of priority, needs to restore US credibility, thus making human rights a more defendable key priority in international relations. Together, the EU and US stand a far better chance of furthering democratic change and sustainable improvement of the living conditions in Cuba. It is also then that other foreign partners, notably from Latin America, could be more easily approached to engage on Cuba along commonly agreed upon agendas. A realistic scenario, however, has to consider that political change in Cuba will probably take longer and most likely be preceded by economic reform measures coming from the regime itself. Foreign actors wishing to assist in this process in a meaningful manner, are well advised to pursue a long term, incentives-based approach to both the Cuban authorities and Cuba’s emerging civil society, including the human rights defenders. Outlook: Will President Obama radically change US policy towards Cuba? An answer to that question requires reviewing three important factors: first, constraints and opportunities in the political environment in the US, i.e. power constellations in the Congress and in Florida; second, interests in Cuba, i.e. Cuba’s elite and the domestic opposition; and third, likely reactions in the international community, i.e. within the Latin American and Caribbean region; in Europe; with respect to Cuba’s allies; and last but not least, at multilateral level. 6.1 What are the key considerations in today’s political environment in the US? During the electoral campaign Obama promised to undo the restrictions on travel and remittances imposed by the first Bush administration. He called the embargo a “complete fiasco” but shied away from suggesting the lifting of the economic sanctions or revoking Helms-Burton, saying that he would maintain the embargo as long as no substantial political reform and release of political prisoners would take place on the island. In essence, Obama’s proposed measures would correspond to a policy similar to the one enacted during the second term of President Clinton. This was during the campaign. Is it reasonable to assume that Obama’s resounding victory nation-wide and in Florida provide a more conducive domestic platform for overhauling for good the failed and discredited embargo policy? Most observers would give a negative answer, at least during President Obama’s first two years in office, and this for the following reasons: First, Cuba and Latin America are not among the top foreign policy concerns at this juncture. Second, while US business is clearly interested in strengthening trade and developing investment ties with Cuba strong pressure, so far, has only come from the agribusiness sector which succeeded in exporting US goods despite the embargo since 2002. Moreover, Cuban demand is still crippled by rather modest purchasing power and the overall business and regulatory environment is certainly not conducive to foreign investment. Third, despite a change in the electoral map overall and a slow generational change within the Cuban-American community, a clear majority of registered Cuban-American voters actually participating in elections leans towards the Republican party and can still be mobilized around the single issue of taking a principled stance against the Castro regime (e.g. all three Republican incumbents in Miami Dade county have re-won their seats; moreover, in 2010 Senator Mel Martinez’ seat comes up for election – if the Democrats were to take his seat they could come close to gaining a filibuster-proof majority in the Senate). Few commentators, on the other hand, think that the new president should and could lift the embargo during his first year in office, arguing that he enjoys at present and for a limited period only, a unique window of opportunity because of the high rate of approval at home and abroad (including in Cuba among the Afro-Cuban community). Lifting the embargo unconditionally would be widely heralded as the dawning of a new era in the Western Hemisphere and beyond, with immediate positive repercussions on bilateral relations with all major Latin American and Caribbean countries. Pressure to lift the embargo, or parts of it, may also come from the powerful US oil lobby if commercially viable finds are discovered in Cuba’s exclusive economic zone, with Cuba actively courting US investments in the remaining off-shore blocks. It would make little sense for the US to prohibit off-shore oil exploration in Florida’s continental shelf when a few miles further down South numerous international companies exploit Cuba’s oil and gas reserves. Moreover, the argument goes, President Obama does not need to ‘pander’ to the conservative Cuban-American vote in South Florida (i.e. those 65% having voted for McCain) because this part of the electorate will remain an anti-Obama constituency no matter what he does. As a matter of fact, the democrats could actually loose Latino votes in Florida in the next elections among the nonCuban Latino community and among those 35% of Cuban-Americans having supported Obama in 2008 (according to exit polls 75% of whom are reported to be against the embargo) if his Cuba policy changes remain largely symbolic, i.e. simply undoing what has been established under President Bush, while maintaining the embargo. As far as the 2010 Florida senate seat is concerned seasoned political analysts recall that, traditionally, any incumbent president’s party tends to loose seats in mid-term elections, thus making the prospect of getting closer to the 60 seat majority a rather difficult task (especially if former governor Jeb Bush were to run for the vacant post). 6.2 How about the political environment in Cuba? Since coming to power in August 2006 Raul Castro has reiterated on several occasions that Cuba is willing to discuss with the US ways and means to improve bilateral relations and bring an end to the policy of confrontation. The only requisite would be to conduct these talks on the basis of equality and without any political pre-conditions. These statements did not contain much of a political risk for Havana since they were unlikely to be heeded by the Bush administration. If, however, the Obama administration were to take them at face value, it is fair to say that Cuba’s government appears to be ill-prepared for commencing meaningful discussions with the US. For the past 50 years the official dogma was based on the premise that US policy is hostile, interventionist and imperialist. A fundamental overhaul of the US approach towards Havana would make it difficult for the Cuban government to continue propagating the David-versus-Goliath myth, considering that the new US president, as an Afro-American, shares with two-thirds of Cubans a similar ethnic background. Obama may indeed be perceived by many in Cuba as the personification of a different, less fearful and certainly better America. In this context it is interesting to note that Armando Hart, former Minister of Culture and one of the chief ideologues of the Communist party, published an article in Granma in October 2008 where he underlined the need for defending the Cuban Revolution against the erosive power of a non-embargo centered, i.e. open door US policy towards Cuba. Havana might, indeed, not be ready yet to engage with Washington under a non-embargo scenario. The present situation, with the embargo being nominally in place (yet discredited internationally and in Cuba, in addition to being undermined in its impact because of direct commercial links with US business and the massive flow of remittances without the ‘danger’ of millions of visiting Americans pouring into the island), seems to be the best of both worlds for Cuba: while Havana can blame US hostility for domestic development problems, which serves the regime well politically both abroad and at home, the embargo does not do any major economic and financial damage that would jeopardize the survival of the regime. Furthermore, Cuba’s illegal political opposition strongly disagrees with the embargo because the continuation of a coercive policy framework is used by the authorities as a pretext to discredit those opposing the regime as ‘puppets’ and ‘counterrevolutionary agents’ at the service of the US. The Cuban opposition would clearly prefer Washington to conduct an open door policy addressing all sectors of the Cuban society, including, of course, concrete measures supporting directly the emerging dissident movement and providing high-profile visibility to human rights defenders. 6.3 How would the international community react? At international level all major actors would clearly welcome an end to the embargo. While the sanctions policy allowed European, Canadian and, more recently, Venezuelan, Chinese, Brazilian and Russian to become more involved with Cuba in the absence of competitors from the US (with the exception of agriculture produce), most of the foreign powers, and in particular the EU and Latin American countries, would clearly support a definite lifting of the coercive measures. Ending the embargo would be perceived as a decision carrying a momentum of powerful symbolism since it would signal a newly found willingness in Washington to reconsider the usefulness of acting unilaterally and outside the international legal framework. As a matter of fact, together with other measures such as closing Guantanamo, signing up to the Kyoto Protocol and putting into practice the succeeding agreement under the Bali conference, and possibly, joining the International Criminal Court as well as ratifying further international human rights treaties such as the 1990 Convention on the Rights of the Child, it would be interpreted by the international community as steps towards effective multilateralism.

#### Second, the plan fosters a credible conflict resolution model– status quo policies risk disengagement and pressures risk destabilizing Cuba

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At the international political level, President Obama sees resuming relations with Cuba as a real step towards multilateralism and leadership. U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon made the following statement about then President-elect Barrack Obama’s national election. “He spoke about a “new era of global partnership…I am confident that we can look forward to an era of renewed partnership and a new multilateralism." To highlight this point further, U.N. nations have voted overwhelmingly since 1992 to overturn the Cuban Embargo. In 2007, 184 nations voted against the embargo5 - a **powerful statement about U.S. unilateralism with regards to Cuba**. The argument can also be made that the U.S. has foreign relations with China, Saudi Arabia and other non-democratic governments while applying a different standard towardsCuba. With growing perception that Cuba no longer poses a credible threat to the U.S., it appears that U.S. policy has changed from coercive to punitive following the end of the Cold War. With a renewed focus on multilateralism, President Obama could go a long way to break this image by spreading the seeds of a “new beginning” in U.S.-Cuba relations.

While dismissing Cuba’s immediate security threat to the U.S., we cannot ignore their 90-mile proximity to the U.S. shore. As we struggle to contain the illegal Mexican exodus into the U.S. and all the security concerns it poses, we neglect to see the historical similarities in past encounters with the Cuban government that led to similar incursions. So if we critically reexamine the current U.S. – Cuba embargo, why does the U.S. believe it will only lead to Cuban democratization? What about government collapse? A Cuban government collapse akin to Somalia could create a significant refugee situation not to mention an implied U.S. responsibility to provide humanitarian and even stability operations in Cuba. If catastrophe does occur, a search for causes would certainly lead back to our punitive approaches to U.S. diplomacy towards Cuba.

On the other hand, consider that foreign diplomacy achieves a breakthrough under Raul’s Cuba. It could certainly hedge our influence in Latin America. According to Dr. DeShazo, “close bilateral relationships with Venezuela is a product of Fidel Castro-Hugo Chavez friendship and does not enjoy much popular support in Cuba-nor with Raul.” If true, perhaps having a U.S. - Cuba option can become an alternative to that relationship post Fidel Castro. Loosening or lifting the embargo could also be mutually beneficial. Cuba’s need and America’s surplus capability could be mutually beneficial - and eventually addictive to Cuba. Under these conditions, diplomacy has a better chance to flourish. **If negotiations break down** and a decision to continue the embargo is reached, **international support would be easier to garner**.

Almost 21 years since the wall fell in Berlin, it is time to chip away at the diplomatic wall that still remains between U.S. and Cuba. This paper will further define our interests in Cuba and why President Obama should continue his quest for renewed diplomatic relations with Cuba. It will discuss potential risks associated with retaining the current 50-year diplomatic policy and give some broad suggestions regarding a new U.S. – Cuba foreign policy.

Policy and National Interest

Present U.S. policy towards Cuba is economic isolation imposed via embargo to coerce Cuba into establishing a representative government. While the basic policy remains unchanged, the same is not true about U.S. interests in Cuba. During the Cold War, stated U.S. interest was to contain Communism, the leading edge of which was Cuba. More than anything the U.S. wanted Castro’s demise but international support hinged on preventing the spread of communism. After 1989, communism was under siege and capitalism was on the rise. U.S. interests now shifted towards peace and regional stability. Of course, removing the Castro regime was still the preferred method, but without Soviet collusion Castro’s Cuba was no longer a credible threat to the U.S. Not surprisingly, international support quickly dwindled leaving the U.S. as the unilateral enforcer. In hindsight many argued it was the right time to loosen the embargo and seek better relations with Cuba. Instead, a renewed passion to topple Castro and establish democracy fractured any hopes to rekindle relations. In retrospect, Kennedy could not have foreseen a 50-year embargo that survives the Soviet Union’s demise but fails to remove Castro. The same cannot be said about the Obama Administration today. This section will analyze U.S. – Cuba policy, past opportunities and ultimate failure over the past 50 years.

From 1959 to1964, beginning with President Eisenhower but shaped primarily by the Kennedy Administration, U.S. policy was to remove Fidel Castro and establish Democracy in Cuba.6 It can be argued that this policy resonates today but during the early period the U.S. actively pursued removal as the decisive action that would lead to Democracy in Cuba. Political and military efforts to remove Castro in 1961 were reinforced by the initial embargo implementation and tightening that was most effective. Between1965 and 1970, U.S. attempts to maintain a multilateral embargo failed and its effectiveness withered as western governments refused to acquiesce to U.S. - led sanctions. By the time the OAS officially lifted the embargo, Cuba had successfully diversified its trade portfolio and by 1974, 45% of Cuba’s exports came from western governments.7

The period 1965-1972, although officially endorsing the previous administration’s tough stance, largely ignored its neighbor while it dealt with the more pressing conflict in Viet Nam. Containment and a period of Presidential ambivalence towards Cuba allowed tensions to cool between nations. This coupled with a growing fatigue with the Viet Nam War resulted in a renewed engagement to normalize relations with Cuba. A policy of “rapprochement” or normalization began with the Nixon Administration and received promising traction under the Carter Administration in 1977. The rapprochement period, 1973 – 1980, was President Carter’s attempt to curtail communism in Africa and Latin America. By normalizing relations with Cuba, President Carter could leverage this good will to reverse Cuban presence in Ethiopia, Angola and Zaire. Several overt measures were taken to reduce embargo restrictions and in February, 1977 State Department spokesmen Fred Brown “publically acknowledged and accepted a Cuban proposal to begin bilateral talks on maritime boundaries and fishing rights.”8 In June, U.S. National Security Council decided to end the practice of blacklisting foreign ships that called on Cuban ports. Perhaps the most notable improvement that year was to allow foreign diplomats to occupy each other’s embassies. This allowed direct communication between countries; the previous practice had been to use Swiss and Czech proxies.9 Several incidents including the “Soviet Brigade” and the “Mariel Boatlift” in 1980 intensified this opposition and quickly derailed Carter’s initiatives in Congress.

As President Reagan took office in 1980, U.S. – Cuba relations had already soured. The Reagan Administration would reinforce the weakened embargo and a return to a containment strategy under the auspices that Cuba was “promoting terrorism and subversion in virtually every Latin American country”. But strong Congressional opposition against normalizing relations took center stage during the 1980 presidential elections. Several incidents including the “Soviet Brigade” and the “Mariel Boatlift” in 1980 intensified this opposition and quickly derailed Carter’s initiatives in Congress. 10 The White House policy was to “disrupt and destabilize the island’s economy, terminate the Cuban-Soviet alliance, end Cuba’s internationalism, and finally reinsert Cuba within the capitalist politicaleconomic orbit.”11 President Reagan made every attempt to return to an “airtight” embargo but Cuba’s persistent trade with the west subverted the effort. In fact, British and Canadian companies could conduct trade in “America’s back garden without having to compete with U.S. companies.”12 Reagan did however, exact a toll on Cuba’s economy by preventing other nations from allowing Cuba to reschedule its debt: “a process of negotiating new loans to replace existing obligations, either by lengthening maturities, deferring of loan principal payment.”13 This action compelled Cuba to make its most overt concessions towards normalizing U.S. - Cuban relations. Castro removed troops from Africa and reclaimed 2,700 Cuban refugees that had departed to America during the 1980 Mariel Boatlift. Castro even allowed a U.S. Human Rights delegation to visit prisoners in Cuba. In return, the Reagan and Bush Administrations made no significant concessions to Cuba and status quo between countries remained.

The last meaningful opportunity for change occurred after the fall of the Berlin Wall and particularly the window it presented the U.S. following the collapse in Soviet – Cuba relations. During the period 1990 – 1993, internal and economic turmoil following the Soviet Union’s break-up led to a drastic cut in Soviet subsidies and trade relations with Cuba. This action compelled Cuba to make its most overt concessions towards normalizing U.S. - Cuban relations. Castro removed troops from Africa and reclaimed 2,700 Cuban refugees that had departed to America during the 1980 Mariel Boatlift. Castro even allowed a U.S. Human Rights delegation to visit prisoners in Cuba. In return, the Reagan and Bush Administrations made no significant concessions to Cuba and status quo between countries remained. 14 This led to a 34% drop in Cuban economy forcing Castro to renew western trade options and relook his own draconian business and commercial practices. The first Bush Administration passed on this precious opportunity, ignoring Cuba’s overt concessions late in the previous administration and choosing instead to enact the 1992 Cuban Democracy Act reversing Carter’s amendment to allow third country U.S. companies from trading with Cuba.15

By the time President Clinton came to office, momentum had already shifted in Cuba’s favor. Cuba’s economy began to rise in 1994 reaching its apex in 1996 with a 41% increase thanks to foreign investments in tourism. The introduction of the HelmsBurton legislation in 1996 gained Congressional traction after the Cuban Air force shot down two, anti-Castro “Brothers in Rescue,” planes over Cuba. The Helms-Burton Act created unrealistic expectations for the Cuban government before U.S. would loosen restrictions with Cuba. A total of eight requirements had to be met and the most controversial of these included; a transitional government in place unlike the Castro regime; the dissolution of the Department of State; Cuba must hold free and fair elections and a controversial property law that allowed property owners that left Cuba as early as 1959, to make claims in U.S. Courts on that property. With Cuba’s economy on the rise, this new measure to tighten the noose failed terribly and only succeeded in further alienating both governments.

The second Bush Administration did little to engage Cuba and after September 11, 2001, was completely engrossed in the War on Terror. U.S. policy towards Cuba has changed little in 50 years. Although the embargo continues to fail despite our best efforts to tighten it, our policy has remained steadfast and the U.S. is no closer to normalizing relations with Cuba.

A History of Anger and Distrust

After 50 years, deep-seated distrust and anger exists between the U.S. and Cuba. Perhaps an obvious assessment, but one that if ignored could undermine attempts to repair diplomatic relations between countries. Several diplomatic pitfalls developed over the years could hinder any attempt to reestablish relations. They could spell disaster and set an already tenuous relationship back decades. These triggers are subtle but recognizable over a long and tumultuous period in U.S. – Cuba relations. A historical account will help identify these political impasses and create favorable conditions for diplomatic success in future U.S. – Cuba relations.

Experts argue over who’s started the dispute between nations: was it the Cuban Agrarian Reform Act in 1959 that nationalized agrarian land in Cuba to include U.S. owned lands? Could it have been Cuba’s decision to resume trade with the Soviet 9Union that led to a U.S. imposed embargo on Cuba in 1960? Perhaps the bigger issue was how diplomatic, economic and military efforts by both countries continued to aggravate already strained relations.16 In 1961, Cuban exiles supported by the Central Intelligence Agency failed to topple the Castro government. The Bay of Pigs fiasco sent Cuba a clear signal that the U.S. was not interested in negotiation. Castro answered immediately by allowing Soviets to position nuclear missiles in Cuba, threatening U.S. vital security and leading to the Cuban Missile Crises. These intentions have survived to the present undermining any attempt to pursue common interest and reduce tensions. The underlying fear that U.S. remains committed to toppling the Cuban government constitutes the first diplomatic pitfall in U.S. – Cuban relations. For this very reason, democratic reform will not succeed as a diplomatic bargaining tool with Cuba. Suspicions run deep among Cuban leaders and any inferences to government reform, albeit noble, will impede meaningful relations. Human rights advocacy, free trade and limited business opportunities in Cuba may be more plausible and could eventually encourage the long-term changes U.S. wants in Cuba.

The embargo itself remains a **perpetual albatross** that continues to undermine any real diplomatic progress between nations. A series of coercive measures designed to topple the Castro regime began with U.S. – led efforts to expel Cuba from the Organization of American States (OAS) in January 1962 followed by trade prohibitions on imports and exports to Cuba by the U.S. Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). 17 This was achieved by leveraging an existing 1954 OAS Caracas Resolution designed to prevent trade with communist countries called Trading with the Enemy.18 After bilateral sanctions are established, U.S. pursued broader international support by 10enacting the October 1962 Battle Act prohibiting U.S. assistance to any country that traded with Cuba. An early attempt to persuade the North American Treaty Organization (NATO) nations to comply with the embargo yielded limited success.19 However, a new perceived security threat brought on by the Cuban Missile Crises in late 1962 gave U.S. the leverage it needed in February 1964 to convince NATO nations to effectively cease trade with Cuba. In July 1964, OAS followed NATO’s lead; U.S. had succeeded in isolating Cuba from its western traders.20

Tightening the noose placed extraordinary economic pressure on Cuba considering U.S. multilateral efforts reduced western trade by 73% in 1964. Cuba was obliged to subsidize this deficit with the Soviet Union and China between1961 – 1973. This trend continued by enticing Latin American and other western countries like Canada and England in the 1980s and following the Soviet fall in the 1990s.21Commensurately, Presidential administrations have loosened and tightened the embargo repeatedly as the climate between nations improved or deteriorated. The Cuban Defense Act in 1992 and the Helms Burton Act in 1996 tightened embargo restrictions signaling continued U.S. intentions to remove the Castro regime. But the U.S. - led embargo played right into Castro’s hand. Castro accused the U.S. calling it “another economic aggression” and stating that Cubans would have to undergo “long years of sacrifice.”22 By demonizing U.S. policy, he was able to galvanize Cuban support during the toughest times. The embargo helped create the American enemy, removing any popular support for rebellion and elevating Castro’s struggle to a legitimate Cuban struggle.11Castro was also complicit in the failure to mend U.S. – Cuba relations. Hiscontinued attempts to export communism began in Africa with a total 55,000 troops in Angola and Ethiopia by 1978. He focused efforts closer to Latin America by supporting Puerto Rican independence movement in 1975, the Sandinistas overthrow in Nicaragua in 1979 and the Farabundo Marti National Liberation (FMLN) in El Salvador. Cuba’s support to Columbia’s M19 (Columbian Election Day April 19, 1970) guerilla movement labeled Cuba a “state sponsor of terrorism” in 1982.23 Castro’s expansion efforts fueled U.S. security paranoia and prevented several overt efforts by the Carter Administration to improve relations with Cuba. In April 1980, an incident at the U.S. Mission in Havana led 120,000 Cubans to depart Mariel Port by boat to the U.S.24 The incident better known as the “Mariel Boatlift” became the tipping point that inhibited further relations with Cuba. Despite the growing tensions between the U.S. and Cuba, trade between the west and Cuba increased. NATO compliance with U.S. - brokered trade restrictions broke down after 1966 in particular due to British and Canadian opposition. U.S. efforts to use the OAS embargo to influence the United Nations also failed. In 1974, Latin American leaders pushed to end the OAS embargo. In 1975 the OAS lifted the embargo with Cuba and the embargo returned to a bilateral embargo now condemnedby most western countries.25 In 1982, Cuba’s failing economy led Castro to pursue western trade with a renewed vigor. By “1987, more than 370 firms from twenty-three European, Latin American, and Asian countries participated in Cuba’s largest ever annual trade fair.”26

Castro’s interest in improving U.S. - Cuba relations was perhaps the greatest from 1982-1988. Castro made statements in 1982 to resume talks with the U.S.; he took back more than 1000 Mariel Boatlift criminals that came to the U.S. in 1987 and pulled troops out of Angola in 1988 to mention a few. These rare moments and apparent seams in Castro’s armor were left unanswered by the Reagan and Bush Administrations. Instead renewed efforts to continue ratcheting a now largely ineffective bilateral embargo served only to increase animosity between both countries.

It is difficult to quantify, but essential to note, that U.S. action over the years seems to support a hatred for Fidel Castro that interferes with any attempt to established diplomatic relations with Cuba. If true, to neglect this assumption could undermine any efforts to reverse our seemingly punitive approach. Perhaps it can be traced to his support for a Soviet-style communism. After all, few things in 1960 America were feared and despised more than communism. Any country affiliated with the communist movement became an affront to the American way of life. Furthermore, Americans shed blood in Cuba during the 1898 Spanish American War leading to Cuban Independence in 1902.27 Fidel Castro became evil’s face in Cuba and any attempt to partner with Castro seemed equally tainted. Fast forwarding to the present, with communism no longer a threat, perhaps it’s time to let the anger fade and deal with Cuba for its’ diplomatic merit not past indiscretions. The question remains whether clear objectiveness leads U.S. diplomatic efforts with Cuba? It is important to note that what’s at stake here is U.S. national interests and not the legacy of Fidel Castro.

Another important pitfall is to exploit democracy as a precondition for diplomacy and **economic engagement** in Cuba. If democracy is virtuous, then why must we exploit it? It casts a negative shadow on a positive change in government. There is a common perception that U.S. policy with regards to security and stability can only exist under the precondition of a “Democratic Cuba”. It has prevented any real progress in U.S. – Cuba relations because of well placed fears that we mean to subvert the Cuban government. A popular Cuban American lobby group, The Cuban American National Foundation summarizes traditional U.S. beliefs towards Cuba. They suggest, “U.S. – Cuba policy should focus on (1) advancing U.S. interests and security in the region and (2) empowering Cuban people in their quest for democracy and prosperity…that these are “intertwined and one cannot be individually accomplished without the other.”28 The recommendation then focuses largely on steps to pursue a democratic Cuba.

To separate security and stability from democratic pursuits in Cuba could benefit both causes. Focusing on better diplomatic relations could further democracy as a byproduct of increased exposure to open markets, businesses and globalization. China is a good example. The U.S. has diffused tensions with China by exposing them to open markets. Although they continue to embrace communism, their version of communism has been somewhat diluted as they modified their business practices, trade and other aspects to compete in the global marketplace. If you take into account that Cuba’s Growth National Product (GDP) decreased by 4% since 2006 while their debt grew by 16% to almost $20B in 2008, Cuba certainly has incentive to do the same.29 By imposing democracy we jeopardize diplomatic avenues to our principal security and stability pursuits. To assuage the Cuban America position on this issue may be simpler today than 10 years ago. Today’s younger Cuban-American generation is more amenable to closer relations with Cuba. The anger carried by their immigrant forefathers14after 50 years may be passing and perhaps the time is right to leverage this new Cuban American generation to open dialogue with Cuba without the democratic preconditions tied to negotiations.

As we pursue diplomatic relations with Cuba we should not expect full disclosure, immediate results and a Cuban government anxious to please the U.S. We should expect a cautious and limited first engagement that appears noticeably weighted in U.S. effort. Let us assume the U.S. makes significant diplomatic and economic concessions but Cuba is less willing to provide some reciprocal offering. U.S. policy could conclude that Cuba has no genuine desire to consummate new diplomatic relations and diplomacy could fail. It is imperative to understand that the U.S. has done most of the “taking” and hence will, at least for the near future, do most of the “giving”. A steady, patient and continued engagement is needed until Cuba has the confidence to commit to further diplomatic relations.

Current U.S.-Cuba Policy Analysis

Understanding the deep-seated animosity and distrust that continues to fuel U.S. - Cuba tensions will aid us in properly analyzing the feasibility, acceptability and suitability (FAS) of current and future U.S. policy with Cuba. Identifying FAS applications to diplomacy, information, military, economic, finance, intelligence and law enforcement (DIME-FIL) will highlight weaknesses in current U.S. – Cuba relations that can be modified for future improvement.

The logical question with regards to current U.S. – Cuba policy is whether it’s feasible to continue the current policy. At least for the foreseeable future, the answer is yes. It equates to doing nothing diplomatically, militarily and economically. Perhaps this 15option is appealing given a robust domestic agenda and U.S. involvement in two wars. According to Professor Schwab and other experts however, the U.S. has lost the information campaign targeted at the Cuban people. It has only, “buttressed Fidel’s popularity in Cuba and elsewhere, which eviscerates the very purposes the embargo was set up for.”30 It’s like the classic biblical story of David triumphing over Goliath – the bigger the oppressor the greater the victory. True or not, Fidel has made the case successfully to the Cuban people. While it’s feasible for the U.S. to pursue the current course there is no evidence it will succeed.

How acceptable is it to U.S. foreign policy? There are three elements of national power that highlight our current policy: diplomacy, economy and law enforcement. It is subjective to evaluate acceptability strictly in terms of current national power invested and subsequent pay offs in foreign policy. U.S. needs international cooperation to achieve the coercive effects that only complete economic strangulation can accomplish. This is tough to do and North Korea and Iran bear this true. If we look at it from a broader international and economic perspective we can begin to see why it’s not acceptable. Take a UN General Assembly vote renouncing the U.S.-led embargo on Cuba for instance; since1992 there has been overwhelming vote to end the embargo.31 In essence, it has garnered sympathy for Castro and encouraged western nations like Canada and Spain to continue open relations with Cuba. Even if the embargo could work, U.S. diplomacy has failed to yield the international tourniquet needed to bring change in Cuba. Applying economic force without first garnering the necessary diplomatic support failed to achieve intended changes succeeding instead in hurting the Cuban people it hoped to protect. Whether or not an embargo can work in Cuba is suspect but succeeding without international support is impossible. Since the embargo hinges on a larger multinational participation, international and not just U.S. acceptability is necessary to achieve U.S. ends in Cuba.

Several embargo refinements over the years like the Libertad Act have further tightened restrictions on Cuba. These restrictions have placed a heavy burden on the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the Customs and Border Protection (CBP) particularly in Miami. A 2007 GAO report highlights these burdens and how they impede other more important Law Enforcement activities in defense of the homeland.32 GAO findings suggest there’s a real need to balance U.S. paranoia for “everything Cuba.” This rebalancing purports an unacceptable cost-benefit to the current law enforcement aspect of the embargo. It diminishes our greater need to defend against terrorist, criminals and other real threats to our national security. In essence, our efforts to impose embargo restrictions are unacceptable tradeoffs for homeland security.

In the final analysis, U.S. – Cuba policy is not sustainable because it has failed to meet desired national ends: Cuban democracy and human rights. Prior to 1989, the U.S. could make the argument that the embargo contained communism and generally marginalized the Castro government. It failed however, to depose Fidel Castro and democratize the Cuban government. A post Cold War Cuba no longer poses a threat to the U.S. - communism is contained and Cuba is still under embargo. Despite a 50-year failure to affect change in Castro’s government, our policy with regards to Cuba remains unchanged. We have foregone diplomatic engagement and chosen coercive economic power as our only political tool.

Does Cuba Pose A Security Threat to the U.S.?

Let’s begin by asking this question: can we afford to escort commerce through Caribbean waters from Cuban pirates? This sounds as farfetched as an attack from an Afghan-based Al-Qaida using commercial airliners to destroy the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. This scenario while unexpected is completely contrary to our policy objectives in Cuba. The greater possibility that “something” unfavorable happens in Cuba that threatens U.S. national interests is certainly more relevant. Although Cuba poses no traditional threats to the U.S., geographically, their 90-mile proximity should concern us. Our proximity to Cuba assures U.S. involvement, be it voluntary or involuntary, in a major crisis. Consider a disease outbreak that begins in Cuba over a break down in hygiene, government pollution or other misfortune attributable to economic strife. The disease has no boundaries and quickly reaches the Florida shores via travelling Cuban American citizens. This scenario could be mitigated or even preventable under the auspices of better relations. Aside from the obvious medical benefits a partnership provides, established communications with Cuba would likely prevent an uncontrolled spread in the U.S. There are definite advantages to having healthy regional partnerships to deal with regional problems.

While economic pressure has failed to bring about government change, it could trigger a government collapse. If Cuba becomes a “failing” or “failed state” we could see a huge refugee flood into the U.S., increased crime and drug trafficking across U.S. borders, and renewed security and stability issue in the region. In 1980, 120,000 Cuban refugees fled Mariel and 20,000 more in 1994 after Cuba declared an open immigration policy.33 From 2004 – 2007, 131,000 Cubans have made residence in the U.S. Almost 38,000 settled in Florida alone in 2006. Although it’s mere speculation to presume Cuba will fail, if it did, there is no question where Cubans would seek refuge. A failed state could eventually draw U.S. involvement into nation building in Cuba taking a greater toll on our national resources. This scenario, while unexpected, is completely contrary to our policy objectives in Cuba. Current U.S. policy is no longer a sustainable option to achieving our national interests in Cuba. Until realignment can bring national policy back in line with national interests, conditions will not exist for real change in U.S. – Cuba relations.

Proposed U.S.-Cuba Policy Analysis

If today marks President Obama’s “new strategy” towards Cuba we must begin with U.S. National interests in the broader Latin American context. Over the past 50 years our approach has been germane to Cuba and not the larger Latin American construct. In so doing we have isolated Cuba from Latin America for coercive reasons yes, but also for the very democratic principles we hoped Cuba would follow.

The State Department’s Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs (covers Canada and Cuba) has set the following goals for the region: “Economic partners that are democratic, stable, and prosperous; Friendly neighbors that help secure our region against terrorism and illegal drugs; Nations that work together in the world to advance shared political and economic values.”34 To simplify these goals, let us just say stability, economic prosperity and democracy. Using these as a benchmark, I propose our new diplomatic strategy towards Cuba must be similar - achieve economic stability, security and a representative government as the “end state” goal and not the prerequisite for engagement. President Obama can implement this policy by first building American and Congressional support for engagement. He should establish a formal infrastructure that communicates to Cuba and the International Community at large that we’re serious about diplomatic engagement with Cuba. Finally, we must loosen embargo restrictions and expose Cubans to U.S. open markets, business opportunities and 21st Century living. This combination will improve relations with Cuba by regaining their trust, improving their living conditions and exposing them to the democratic enticements we hope they will emulate.

Achieving Congressional approval will be difficult although not impossible in the present economic recession. The economic benefits associated with new business opportunities in Cuba can encourage skeptics in Congress to mobilize. As a counterargument to a continued embargo, the President can point to the dangers associated with failed states like Somalia inadvertently caused by the very environment sanctions create. A strong communication strategy to gain American support coupled with a softening Cuban American stance, shrouded in economic opportunity, could encourage Congressional dialogue and resolution. President Obama can succeed if he sets realistic goals and expresses these to the American public before the media or his opposition defines these.

We’ve established that coercive means have failed to achieve democracy and economic stability in Cuba. I’m suggesting there is another mutually beneficial alternative. Using China as an example, their exposure and need to compete in free global markets broadened their horizons and shifted their hard line communist approach to international diplomacy. This was a feat that coercive diplomacy has not accomplished in Cuba. Yet we still have civil disagreements with China on human rights issues, Taiwan’s right to independence and other contentious issues without resorting to coercive measures. Why should Cuba receive different treatment? The confusion lies with our tendency to impose democracy as a precondition for diplomatic relations. How can Cuba subscribe to small business practices, a free economy building block, if business opportunities are not available? Diplomatic engagement and economic encouragement has a better chance. Cuba’s economic condition incentivizes their willingness to begin diplomatic negotiations. The U.S. should begin by focusing efforts to establish diplomatic relations through incentives rather than coercion. We must also set the democratic precondition aside to pursue when the relationship matures and trust is reestablished. Exposing them to new opportunities will eventually, through their own discovery and U.S. shepherding, lead them to a more representative government.

If we accept that reestablishing relations with Cuba is the first real step to a democratic end-state then the first action must be to appoint an Ambassador to Cuba. This diplomatic gesture signals that U.S. is serious about foreign relations. The Ambassador’s first actions must include setting the conditions with Cuba to allow a loosening of embargo restrictions. President Obama, in the spirit of multilateralism, should pursue international solidarity since some countries enjoying exclusive trade with Cuba would certainly protest the immediate competition. Choosing a time-phased removal would protect U.S. assets and interests in the remote possibility that Cuba fails to comply with the agreed bi-national or international terms. It might also sooth domestic and partisan anxiety regarding open trade with Cuba. President Obama must accomplish this early in his first term to allow time to reap success or mitigate failure before the next elections.

The U.S. cannot afford to miss another opportunity to normalize relations with Cuba. A Cuba without Fidel is an opportunity – whether it is Raul or his replacement in 2013. The U.S. must lay the foundation today for renewed U.S. Cuba relations. Delaying could also signal the contrary to Raul Castro suspiciously awaiting the true purpose of recent U.S. concessions.

While a long term goal may be to influence change in government, it cannot be the basis for initial success and continued diplomacy. With diplomatic patience and a prosperous Cuba, we have reason to believe, like China and Russia that capitalism will prevail over communism. But new politicians and a younger generation of Americans who measure success between terms and administrations will not understand if results aren’t immediate or commensurate to U.S. efforts. Instead, the strategy pursued must occur with a measured diplomatic optimism that insures immediate setbacks don’t derail the restoration of trust that must occur before complete reciprocation can be expected.

Conclusion

Today, 20 years have passed since the fall of the Berlin Wall – it’s time to chip away at the diplomatic wall that still remains between U.S. and Cuba. As we seek a new foreign policy with Cuba it is imperative that we take into consideration that distrust will characterize negotiations with the Cuban government. On the other hand, consider that loosening or lifting the embargo could also be mutually beneficial. Cuba’s need and America’s surplus capability to provide goods and services could be profitable and eventually addictive to Cuba. Under these conditions, diplomacy has a better chance to flourish.

If the Cuban model succeeds President Obama will be seen as a true leader for multilateralism. Success in Cuba could **afford the international momentum and credibility to solve other seemingly “wicked problems” like the Middle East and Kashmir**. President Obama could leverage this international reputation with other rogue nations like Iran and North Korea who might associate their plight with Cuba.35 The U.S. could begin to lead again and reverse its perceived decline in the greater global order bringing true peace for years to come.

#### Changing Cuba policy uniquely key – it’s highly symbolic of the US attitude towards the entire region

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The geopolitical context in Latin America provides another reason the U.S. government should make a serious shift on Cuba. For five years now, Obama has ignored Latin America's unanimous disapproval of Washington's position on Cuba. Rather than perpetuate Havana's diplomatic isolation, U.S. policy embodies the imperial pretensions of a bygone era, contributing to Washington's own marginalization. Virtually all countries in the region have refused to attend another Summit of the Americas meeting if Cuba is not at the table. Cuba, in turn, currently chairs the new Community of Latin American and Caribbean States, which excludes Washington. The Obama administration has begun laying out what could become a serious second-term agenda for Latin America focused on energy, jobs, social inclusion, and deepening integration in the Americas. But the symbolism of Cuba across the region is such that the White House can definitively lead U.S. -- Latin American relations out of the Cold War and into the twenty-first century only by shifting its Cuba policy. To make such a shift, however, Washington must move past its assumption that Havana prefers an adversarial relationship with the United States. Raúl Castro has shown that he is not his brother and has availed himself of numerous channels, public and private, to communicate to Washington that he is ready to talk. This does not mean that he or his successors are prepared to compromise on Cuba's internal politics; indeed, what Castro is willing to put on the table remains unclear. But his government's decisions to release more than 120 political prisoners in 2010 and 2011 and allow a number of dissident bloggers and activists to travel abroad this year were presumably meant to help set the stage for potential talks with the United States. Meanwhile, the death of Hugo Chávez, the former Venezuelan president, and the narrow margin in the election of his successor, Nicolás Maduro, have made it clear that Havana has reasons of its own to chart a path forward with the United States. In the last decade or so, Cuba came to depend on Venezuela for large supplies of subsidized oil, in exchange for a sizable brigade of Cuban doctors staffing the Chávez government's social programs. Political uncertainty in Caracas offers a potent reminder of the hazards of relying too heavily on any one partner. Havana is already beginning to branch out. In addition to financing the refurbishing of Mariel Harbor, the Brazilians have extended a line of credit to renovate and expand five airports across the island and have recently signed a deal to hire 6,000 Cuban doctors to fill shortages in Brazil's rural health coverage. Even so, in the long run, the United States remains a vital natural market for Cuban products and services. Of course, as the 1990s proved, even a huge financial setback may not be enough to drive Havana to Washington's door. Half a century of U.S. economic warfare has conditioned Cuban bureaucrats and party cadres to link openness at home or toward the United States with a threat to Cuba's independence. Some hard-liners might prefer muddling through with the status quo to the uncertainty that could come from a wider opening of their country. The best way to change such attitudes, however, would be for Washington to take the initiative in establishing a new diplomatic and economic modus vivendi with Havana. In the short term, the two countries have numerous practical problems to solve together, including environmental and security challenges, as well as the fate of high-profile nationals serving time in U.S. and Cuban prisons. Most of the policy-steps Obama should take at this stage -- removing Cuba from the list of state sponsors of terrorism, eliminating obstacles for all Americans to travel there, and licensing greater trade and investment -- would not require congressional approval or any grand bargain with Havana. Although it might be politically awkward in the United States for a president to be seen as helping Castro, on the island, such measures would strengthen the case that Cuba can stand to become a more open, democratic society without succumbing to external pressure or subversion. Deeper commercial ties, moreover, could have repercussions beyond the economic realm, giving internal reformers more leeway and increasing support on the island for greater economic and political liberalization. In 1991, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev stood beside U.S. Secretary of State James Baker in Moscow and announced that the Soviet Union would eliminate its multibillion-dollar annual subsidy to Cuba. CIA analysts and American pundits immediately began predicting the imminent demise of the Cuban Revolution and a quick capitalist restoration. More than 20 years have passed since then, Fidel Castro has retired, and 82-year-old Raul Castro is now serving the first year of what he has said will be his final five-year term as president. In 2018, when Díaz-Canel takes the reins, Cuba in all likelihood will continue to defy post-Cold War American fantasies even as it moves further away from its orthodox socialist past. For the remaining members of Cuba's founding revolutionary generation, such a delicate transformation provides a last opportunity to shape their legacy. For Cubans born after 1991, the coming years may offer a chance to begin leaving behind the state of prolonged ideological and economic limbo in which they were raised. Obama, meanwhile, has a choice. He can opt for the path of least political resistance and allow the well-entrenched bureaucrats, national security ideologues, and pro-embargo voices in his own country to keep Cuba policy in a box, further alienating regional allies and perpetuating the siege mentality among Cuban officials. Or he can dare to be the president who finally extracts the United States from Cuba's internal debate and finds a way for Washington and Havana to work together. Both the Cuban people and U.S. national interests would benefit as a result.

#### That bolsters influence-allowing the US to lead multilateral forums- Latin relations uniquely key to effective leverage

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Speaking in Santiago, Chile, in March of last year, President Obama called Latin America “a region on the move,” one that is “more important to the prosperity and security of the United States than ever before.” Somebody forgot to tell the Washington brain trust. The Center for a New American Security, a respected national security think tank a half-mile from the White House, recently released a new series of policy recommendations for the next presidential administration. The 70-page “grand strategy” report only contained a short paragraph on Brazil and made only one passing reference to Latin America. Yes, we get it. The relative calm south of the United States seems to pale in comparison to other developments in the world: China on a seemingly inevitable path to becoming a global economic powerhouse, the potential of political change in the Middle East, the feared dismemberment of the eurozone, and rogue states like Iran and North Korea flaunting international norms and regional stability. But the need to shore up our allies and recognize legitimate threats south of the Rio Grande goes to the heart of the U.S.’ changing role in the world and its strategic interests within it. Here are three reasons why the U.S. must include Latin America in its strategic calculations: 1. Today, pursuing a global foreign policy requires regional allies. Recently, countries with emerging economies have appeared to be taking positions diametrically opposed to the U.S. when it comes to matters of global governance and human rights. Take, for example, Russia and China’s stance on Syria, rejecting calls for intervention. Another one of the BRICS, Brazil, tried to stave off the tightening of U.N. sanctions on Iran two years ago. And last year, Brazil also voiced its official opposition to intervention in Libya, leading political scientist Randall Schweller to refer to Brazil as “a rising spoiler.” At a time of (**perceived**) declining U.S. influence, it’s important that America deepens its ties with **regional allies** that might have been once taken for granted. As emerging nations such as Brazil clamor for permanent seats on the U.N. Security Council and more representatives in the higher reaches of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, the U.S. will need to integrate them into global decision-making rather than isolate them. If not, they could be a thorn in the side of the U.S. as it tries to implement its foreign policy agenda. Worse, they could threaten to undermine efforts to defend international norms and human rights. 2. Latin America is becoming more international. It’s time to understand that the U.S. isn’t the only country that has clout in Latin America. For far too long, U.S. officials and Latin America experts have tended to treat the region as separate, politically and strategically, from the rest of the world. But as they’ve fought battles over small countries such as Cuba and Honduras and narrow bore issues such as the U.S.-Colombia free-trade agreement, other countries like China and India have increased their economic presence and political influence in the region. It’s also clear that countries such as Brazil and Venezuela present their own challenges to U.S. influence in the region and even on the world forum. The U.S. must embed its Latin America relations in the conceptual framework and strategy that it has for the rest of the world, rather than just focus on human rights and development as it often does toward southern neighbors such as Cuba. 3. There are security and strategic risks in the region. Hugo Chavez’s systematic deconstruction of the Venezuelan state and alleged ties between FARC rebels and some of Chavez’s senior officials have created a volatile cocktail that could explode south of the U.S. border. FARC, a left-wing guerrilla group based in Colombia, has been designated as a “significant foreign narcotics trafficker” by the U.S. government. At the same time, gangs, narcotics traffickers and transnational criminal syndicates are overrunning Central America. In 2006, Mexican President Felipe Calderón launched a controversial “war on drugs” that has since resulted in the loss of over 50,000 lives and increased the levels of violence and corruption south of the Mexican border in Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras and even once-peaceful Costa Rica. Increasingly, these already-weak states are finding themselves overwhelmed by the corruption and violence that has come with the use of their territory as a transit point for drugs heading north. Given their proximity and close historical and political connections with Washington, the U.S. will find it increasingly difficult not to be drawn in. Only this case, it won’t be with or against governments — as it was in the 1980s — but in the far more complex, sticky situation of failed states. There are many other reasons why Latin America is important to U.S. interests. It is a market for more than 20% of U.S. exports. With the notable exception of Cuba, it is nearly entirely governed by democratically elected governments — a point that gets repeated ad nauseum at every possible regional meeting. The Western Hemisphere is a major source of energy that has the highest potential to seriously reduce dependence on Middle East supply. And through immigration, Latin America has close personal and cultural ties to the United States. These have been boilerplate talking points since the early 1990s. But the demands of the globe today are different, and they warrant a renewed engagement with Latin America — a strategic pivot point for initiatives the U.S. wants to accomplish elsewhere. We need to stop thinking of Latin America as the U.S. “backyard” that is outside broader, global strategic concerns.

#### Multilateralism leads to greater power sharing and international cooperation, resolving conflict

**Pouliot 11** — Professor of Political Science at McGill University (Vincent Pouliot, “Multilateralism as an End in Itself,” International Studies Perspectives (2011) 12, 18–26)//NG

Because it rests on open, nondiscriminatory debate, and the routine exchange of viewpoints, the multilateral procedure introduces three key advantages that are gained, regardless of the specific policies adopted, and tend to diffuse across all participants. Contrary to the standard viewpoint, according to which a rational preference or functional imperative lead to multilateral cooperation, here it is the systematic practice of multilateralism that creates the **drive to cooperate**. At the theoretical level, the premise is that it is not only what people think that explains what they do, but also what they do that determines what they think (Pouliot 2010). Everyday multilateralism is a self-fulfilling practice for at least three reasons. First, the joint practice of multilateralism creates mutually recognizable [and] patterns of action among global actors. This process owes to the fact that practices structure social interaction (Adler and Pouliot forthcoming).2 Because they are meaningful, organized, and repeated, practices generally convey a degree of mutual intelligibility that allows people to develop social relations over time. In the field of international security, for example, the practice of deterrence is premised on a limited number of gestures, signals, and linguistic devices that are meant, as Schelling (1966:113) put it, to ‘‘getting the right signal across.’’ The same goes with the practice of multilateralism, which rests on a set of political and social patterns that establish the boundaries of action in a mutually intelligible fashion. These structuring effects, in turn, allow for the development of **common frameworks** for appraising global events. Multilateral dialog serves not only to find joint solutions; it also makes it possible for various actors to zoom in on the definition of the issue at hand—a particularly important step on the global stage. The point is certainly not that the multilateral procedure leads everybody to agree on everything—that would be as impossible as counterproductive. Theoretically speaking, there is room for skepticism that multilateralism may ever allow communicative rationality at the global level (see Risse 2000; Diez and Steans 2005). With such a diverse and uneven playing field, one can doubt that discursive engagement, in and of itself, can lead to common lifeworlds. Instead, what the practice of multilateralism fosters is the emergence of a shared framework of interaction—for example, a common linguistic repertoire—that allows global actors to make sense of world politics in mutually recognizable ways. Of course, they may not agree on the specific actions to be taken, but at least they can build on an established pattern of political interaction to deal with the problem at hand—sometimes even before it emerges in acute form. In today’s pluralistic world, that would already be a considerable achievement. In that sense, multilateralism may well be a constitutive practice of what Lu (2009) calls ‘‘political friendship among peoples.’’ The axiomatic practice of principled and inclusive dialog is quite apparent in the way she describes this social structure: ‘‘While conflicts, especially over the distribution of goods and burdens, will inevitably arise, under conditions of political friendship among peoples, they will be negotiated within a global background context of norms and institutions based on mutual recognition, equity in the distribution of burdens and benefits of global **cooperation, and power-sharing** in the institutions of global governance rather than domination by any group’’ (2009:54–55). In a world where multilateralism becomes an end in itself, this ideal pattern emerges out of the structuring effects of axiomatic practice: take the case of NATO, for instance, which has recently had to manage, through the multilateral practice, fairly strong internal dissent (Pouliot 2006). While clashing views and interests will never go away in our particularly diverse world, as pessimists are quick to emphasize (for example, Dahl 1999), the management of discord is certainly made easier by shared patterns of dialog based on mutually recognizable frameworks. Second, the multilateral procedure typically ensures a remarkable level of **moderation** in the global policies adopted. In fact, a quick historical tour d’horizon suggests that actors engaged in multilateralism tend to **avoid radical solutions** in their joint decision making. Of course, the very process of uniting disparate voices helps explain why multilateralism tends to produce median consensus. This is not to say that the multilateral practice inevitably leads to lowest common denominators. To repeat, because it entails complex and often painstaking debate before any actions are taken, the multilateral procedure forces involved actors to devise and potentially share **similar analytical lenses** that, in hindsight, make the policies adopted seem inherently, and seemingly ‘‘naturally,’’ moderate. This is because the debate about what a given policy means takes place before its implementation, which makes for a much smoother ride when decisions hit the ground. This joint interpretive work, which constitutes a crucial aspect of multilateralism, creates outcomes that are generally perceived as inherently reasonable. Participation brings inherent benefits to politics, as Bachrach (1975) argued in the context of democratic theory. Going after the conventional liberal view according to which actors enter politics with an already fixed set of preferences, Bachrach observes that most of the time people define their interests in the very process of participation. The argument is not that interests formed in the course of social interaction are in any sense more altruistic. It rather is that the nature and process of political practices, in this case multilateralism, matter a great deal in shaping participants’ preferences (Wendt 1999). In this sense, not only does the multilateral practice have structuring effects on global governance, but it is also constitutive of what actors say, want, and do (Adler and Pouliot forthcoming). Third and related, multilateralism lends **legitimacy** to the policies that it generates by virtue of the debate that the process necessarily entails. There is no need here to explain at length how deliberative processes that are inclusive of all stakeholders tend to produce outcomes that are generally considered more socially and politically acceptable. In the long run, the large ownership also leads to more **efficient implementation**, because actors feel **invested** in the enactment of solutions on the ground. Even episodes of political failure, such as the lack of UN reaction to the Rwandan genocide, can generate useful lessons when re-appropriated multilaterally—think of the Responsibility to Protect, for instance.3 From this outlook, there is no contradiction between efficiency and the axiomatic practice of multilateralism, quite the contrary. The more multilateralism becomes the normal or self-evident practice of global governance, the more benefits it yields for the many stakeholders of global governance. In fact, multilateralism as an end in and of itself could generate even more diffuse reciprocity than Ruggie had originally envisioned. Not only do its distributional consequences tend to even out, multilateralism as a global governance routine also creates **self-reinforcing dynamics** and new focal points for strategic interaction. The axiomatic practice of multilateralism helps define problems in commensurable ways and craft moderate solutions with wide-ranging ownership—three processual benefits that further strengthen the impetus for multilateral dialog. Pg. 21-23

#### Multilateralism solves inevitable Asian transition wars which go nuclear

**Kugler, 6 –** Professor of World Politics at Claremont Graduate University (Jacek, “The Asian Ascent: Opportunity for Peace or Precondition for War?”, <http://sobek.colorado.edu/~lewiso/Kugler%20-%20The%20Asian%20Ascent.pdf>) NG

Given the fundamental importance of demographic and economic forces in establishing the roster of states capable of fundamentally affecting the structure of world politics, whatever resolution there might be to the Global War on Terror will not alter the major challenge faced by the United States. In the long run, China’s demographic and hence economic power cannot be denied. By the same reasoning, the Middle East has no long-run demographic or economic power. The U.S. courts long-term peril by being obsessively distracted by short-term objectives. To ensure real peace, the U.S. would be much better advised to preserve strong links with the EU, maintain and improve cordial relations with Russia, and most importantly, open a sincere dialogue with India and China designed to maximize their support for the existing status quo. To be sure, positive, but limited, steps have been taken by the United States. American support for China’s entry into the World Trade Organization was important because it helps integrate China’s growing economy more fully into the capitalist world economy. Similar recognition for India, not to mention support for Indian membership on the United Nations Security Council, would also be beneﬁcial. Because Taiwan and Korea have replaced the Cold War’s Berlin as focal points for potential Great Power conﬂict, ﬁnding an accommodation that meets the desires of the main parties with respect to them is central to the preservation of long-term peace. The economic, demographic, and political science research summarized above suggests that American foreign policy attention must center on China and India as the major future contenders for global leadership. Although China retains a political ideology inconsistent with democracy, there are good reasons to expect and thus to work toward change to a participatory system based on increasing prosperity (Feng 2003; Feng and Zak 2003). India is the largest democracy in the world, but like China it is still not a major partner of the Western world. While these relationships may develop and prosper on their own, the relative amount of attention paid to these rising giants compared with the Global War on Terror is simply insupportable. Neither convergence arguments nor power transition theory suggests that future Great Power war between Asia and the West is inevitable. The research described here offers evidence about probabilistic relationships between parity and status quo evaluations on the one hand, and war on the other. Thus, while China’s overtaking of the U.S. may be relatively certain, the result of that overtaking is not. Power transition research supports claims that overtakings are dangerous when policy makers fail to accommodate them. A conﬂict between China or India and the United States as the Asian giants emerge from the shadows of underdevelopment is **not inevitable**. Rather, the political negotiations among contenders determine whether potential challengers can be made satisﬁed with the rules and norms governing world politics. If the declining dominant state is able to engineer a satisfactory compromise between the demands of the rising state and its own requirements (as Britain and the U.S. did when peacefully passing the mantle of international leadership), war is not expected. If the two sides remain intransigent, **war is expected**. It is clear that such a war in the twenty-ﬁrst century would have a **very high probability** of involving **nuclear weapons**. A clear counterexpectation can be drawn from classical nuclear deterrence arguments. They involve a fundamental assumption that as the costs of war increase, the probability of war decreases. Nuclear weapons are then alleged to alter calculations substantially because they raise the expected costs of war so high that war becomes unthinkable. According to this logic, a global war between a newly predominant China and a declining U.S. will never occur thanks to the pacifying inﬂuence of the balance of terror. A new Cold War is anticipated by this nuclear deterrence argument. Consistent with this theory, various scholars have advocated the proliferation of nuclear weapons as one method to prevent wars (Intriligator and Brito 1981; Waltz 1981; Bueno de Mesquita and Riker 1982). An odd paradox is raised by the fact that many world leaders accept nuclear deterrence claims, such as that about the stability of mutual assured destruction (MAD), while rejecting the logical concomitant that proliferation of nuclear weapons to more and more states is desirable. What follows logically has stubbornly resisted practical implementation. Thus, using some other logic, leaders of nuclear nations seem to agree that deterrence is stable under MAD but nevertheless also agree that nuclear proliferation must be prevented in order to preserve peace. If decision makers really believed MAD is stable, it is impossible to understand why they would oppose nuclear proliferation to Iran, thereby creating stable nuclear parity in the Middle East. This inconsistency was noted years ago by Rosen (1977), but subsequently conveniently overlooked. Theory and policy may frequently be at odds, but seldom when the costs of such logical inconsistency are so high. Power transition theorists are inherently suspicious of MAD arguments about nuclear stability because they essentially resurrect traditional balance of power arguments. Rather than focusing on conventional balance as a pacifying inﬂuence, nuclear deterrence proponents of MAD suggest that a nuclear balance will maintain the peace. Given a fortuitous absence of wars among nuclear states thus far, it is impossible to test arguments such as that about MAD. But what we can observe is not promising. It is not only policy makers who doubt the veracity of MAD when they deny the logical consequence of ‘‘beneﬁcial’’ proliferation. Recent formal presentations of deterrence arguments strongly suggest that a preponderance of nuclear capabilities specifically in the possession of satisﬁed states is more amenable to peace than is MAD (Zagare and Kilgour 2000). Power transition theorists, informed by their own as well as by **decades** of demographic and economic research, strongly doubt that nuclear parity between the U.S. and a risen but dissatisﬁed China could preserve the peace. Conclusions It is entirely reasonable to anticipate that Asia will dominate world politics by the end of the century. The most important issue facing American decision makers is how to handle the anticipated overtaking. The research summarized here indicates that the one element of Asia’s ascent that Western decision makers can manipulate is Asia’s relative acceptance of the international system’s existing norms and values. War is not an inevitable certainty. The opportunity for peace is at hand. If Western decision makers can persuade Chinese and Indian leaders through word and deed to join with the current global status quo, peace and prosperity should endure. If, on the other hand, China and India cannot be persuaded to join the existing structure of relations, then the chances for conﬂict increase around mid-century. The research summarized here suggests this is true even in

in the face of the enormous costs that reasonably would be anticipated from a nuclear war.

#### Solves Indo-Pak war which goes nuclear

Greg Chaffin 11, Research Assistant at Foreign Policy in Focus, July 8, 2011, “Reorienting U.S. Security Strategy in South Asia,” online: <http://www.fpif.org/articles/reorienting_us_security_strategy_in_south_asia>

The greatest threat to regional security (although curiously not at the top of most lists of U.S. regional concerns) is the possibility that increased India-Pakistan tension will erupt into all-out war that could quickly escalate into a nuclear exchange. Indeed, in just the past two decades, the two neighbors have come perilously close to war on several occasions. India and Pakistan remain the most likely belligerents in the world to engage in nuclear war. ¶ Due to an Indian preponderance of conventional forces, Pakistan would have a strong incentive to use its nuclear arsenal very early on before a routing of its military installations and weaker conventional forces. In the event of conflict, Pakistan’s only chance of survival would be the early use of its nuclear arsenal to inflict unacceptable damage to Indian military and (much more likely) civilian targets. By raising the stakes to unacceptable levels, Pakistan would hope that India would step away from the brink. However, it is equally likely that India would respond in kind, with escalation ensuing. Neither state possesses tactical nuclear weapons, but both possess scores of city-sized bombs like those used on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. ¶ Furthermore, as more damage was inflicted (or as the result of a decapitating strike), command and control elements would be disabled, leaving individual commanders to respond in an environment increasingly clouded by the fog of war and decreasing the likelihood that either government (what would be left of them) would be able to guarantee that their forces would follow a negotiated settlement or phased reduction in hostilities. As a result any such conflict would likely continue to escalate until one side incurred an unacceptable or wholly debilitating level of injury or exhausted its nuclear arsenal. ¶ A nuclear conflict in the subcontinent would have disastrous effects on the world as a whole. In a January 2010 paper published in Scientific American, climatology professors Alan Robock and Owen Brian Toon forecast the global repercussions of a regional nuclear war. Their results are strikingly similar to those of studies conducted in 1980 that conclude that a nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union would result in a catastrophic and prolonged nuclear winter, which could very well place the survival of the human race in jeopardy. In their study, Robock and Toon use computer models to simulate the effect of a nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan in which each were to use roughly half their existing arsenals (50 apiece). Since Indian and Pakistani nuclear devices are strategic rather than tactical, the likely targets would be major population centers. Owing to the population densities of urban centers in both nations, the number of direct casualties could climb as high as 20 million. ¶ The fallout of such an exchange would not merely be limited to the immediate area. First, the detonation of a large number of nuclear devices would propel as much as seven million metric tons of ash, soot, smoke, and debris as high as the lower stratosphere. Owing to their small size (less than a tenth of a micron) and a lack of precipitation at this altitude, ash particles would remain aloft for as long as a decade, during which time the world would remain perpetually overcast. Furthermore, these particles would soak up heat from the sun, generating intense heat in the upper atmosphere that would severely damage the earth’s ozone layer. The inability of sunlight to penetrate through the smoke and dust would lead to global cooling by as much as 2.3 degrees Fahrenheit. This shift in global temperature would lead to more drought, worldwide food shortages, and widespread political upheaval.¶ Although the likelihood of this doomsday scenario remains relatively low, the consequences are dire enough to warrant greater U.S. and international attention. Furthermore, due to the ongoing conflict over Kashmir and the deep animus held between India and Pakistan, it might not take much to set them off. Indeed, following the successful U.S. raid on bin Laden’s compound, several members of India’s security apparatus along with conservative politicians have argued that India should emulate the SEAL Team Six raid and launch their own cross-border incursions to nab or kill anti-Indian terrorists, either preemptively or after the fact. Such provocative action could very well lead to all-out war between the two that could quickly escalate.

**Contention 2 is Cuban transition:**

#### Cuban reforms are inevitable but the loss of external investment risks economic and social collapse – offering normal trade relations is vital

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Cuba under Raúl Castro has entered a new period of economic, social, and political transformation. Reforms instituted within the past few years have brought the expansion of private sector entrepreneurial activity, including lifting restrictions on the sales of residential real estate, automobiles, and electronic goods. Additional reforms included, more than a million hectares of idle land has been leased to private farmers, where citizens have been granted permission to stay in hotels previously reserved for tourists, and freedom being granted for most Cubans to travel abroad. Stating that it was time for the “gradual transfer” of “key roles to new generations,” President Raúl Castro announced that he will retire by 2018, and named as his possible successor a man who was not even born at the time of the Cuban Revolution. [1] The twilight of the Castro era presents challenges and opportunities for US policy makers. Normalization of relations is inevitable, regardless of timing, yet external and internal factors may accelerate or retard the process. The death of Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez is likely to undermine the already dysfunctional Cuban economy, if it leads to reductions in oil imports and other forms of aid. This could bring social chaos, especially among the island’s disaffected youth. Such an outcome would generate adverse consequences for US national and regional security. To maintain Cuba’s social and economic stability while reforms are maturing, the United States must throw itself open to unrestricted bilateral trade with all Cuban enterprises, both private and state-owned. The collapse of Cuba’s tottering economy could seismically impact the United States and neighboring countries. It certainly did during the Mariel Boatlift of 1980, precipitated by a downturn in the Cuban economy which led to tensions on the island. Over 125,000 Cuban refugees landed in the Miami area, including 31,000 criminals and mental patients. Today, the United States defines its national security interests regarding Cuba as follows: • Avoid one or more mass migrations; • Prevent Cuba from becoming another porous border that allows continuous large-scale migration to the hemisphere; • Prevent Cuba from becoming a major source or transshipment point for the illegal drug trade; • Avoid Cuba becoming a state with ungoverned spaces that could provide a platform for terrorists and others wishing to harm the United States. [2] All of these national security threats are directly related to economic and social conditions within Cuba. US policy specifically supports “a market-oriented economic system” [3] toward Cuba, yet regulations prohibit the importation of any goods of Cuban origin, whether from the island’s potentially booming private sector – including 300,000 agricultural producers – or State-Owned Enterprises (“SOEs”). [4] Such a policy is counterproductive to US interests. Regardless of over 400,000 entrepreneurs, including agricultural cultivators, it could be many years, if ever, when Cuba’s private sector would be ready to serve as the engine of economic growth. SOEs employ 72 percent of Cuban workers. [5] A rational commercial rapprochement towards Cuba would therefore require a change in current laws and in the system of regulations prohibiting the importation of Cuban goods and products. Normalized bilateral trade will benefit the Cuban people by helping to provide economic stability and fostering the growth of a middle class – both of which are essential for the foundation of democratic institutions. Two-way trade must include both Cuba’s private sector as well as SOEs.

#### The unconditional offer of normal trade relations boosts US-Cuban relations and fosters a stable transition – prevents overstretch

**Koenig, 10** – US Army Colonel, paper submitted for a Masters in Strategic Studies at the US Army War College (Lance, “Time for a New Cuba Policy” <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA518130>)

The option with the greatest possibility of success and reward for the United States is to support the Cuban people, but not the Cuban government. The United States should take the following actions unilaterally: • Lift completely the economic embargo. Establish banking and financial relationships to facilitate the trading of goods and services between the two countries. • Lift completely the travel ban to allow not only Cuban-Americans with relatives but also all other Americans to travel to Cuba. This interaction of Americans with Cubans will help raise the awareness of Cubans about their northern neighbor. • Next, the United States should engage the Cuban government to develop a bilateral trade agreement. The goal of this initiative would be to achieve normal trade relations between the two countries. This leaves the issue of compensation for United States companies and individuals whose property was expropriated by the Cuban government. With the embargo lifted, the United States should enlist the assistance of the European Union and Canada to apply pressure to Cuba as well as to assist in negotiations with the World Trade Organization to address issues with illegally confiscated property.36 The United States will gain leverage with the Cuban government as relations improve, and that will be the time to address human rights in Cuba. The return of the Cuban Five, a group of Cuban spies arrested and convicted in Florida, should be worth some human rights concessions. In Cuba, these men are known as the “Cinco Heroes” and their plight is well known.37 So what leverage do we have now that we have unilaterally given the Cuban government most of what they have wanted? Offer to return back to Cuba the Guantanamo Naval Base after the government of Cuba shifts towards a representative orm of government. The foundation for this action has already been laid with the Libertad Act. “The future of the Guantanamo base, a provision in the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 states that once a democratically elected Cuban government is in place, United States policy is to be prepared to enter into negotiations either to return the base to Cuba or to renegotiate the present agreement under mutually agreeable terms.” 38 The United States Congress should soften the language referring to a democratically elected government and instead substitute that a representative form of government is required before entering into negotiations for the Guantanamo base. Once Cuba makes changes towards a representative form of government the United States can start working on democratic reforms. The carrot is to offer Cuba, in exchange for changes to a democratic form of government, support for their return to the Organization of American States (OAS). Until Cuba makes changes towards democracy, the United States should block the request of several member states to let Cuba into the organization. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said it well in a recent interview. “Many member countries originally sought to lift the 1962 suspension and allow Cuba to return immediately, without conditions, others agreed with us that the right approach was to replace the suspension — which has outlived its purpose after nearly half a century — with a process of dialogue and a future decision that will turn on Cuba’s commitment to the organization’s values.”39 These values include promoting democracy and defending human rights. The window of opportunity is open now for this type of change. The Obama administration has taken some steps in this direction with the lifting of remittance limits, unlimited visits to relatives in Cuba, and the ability to provide cell phones to relatives in Cuba. The other recent change is the new majority of Cuban-Americans, in Florida, that support removal of the embargo. Based on votes in the United Nations and the European Union it is clear that world opinion would definitely be supportive of this action. The combination of the above mentioned events now points to an opportunity to make real progress that will benefit both nations. The United States would gain in soft power, gain an additional economic trading partner, and have a chance to influence the type of changes in the Cuban government as the Castro influence wanes. Clearly, support to the Cuban people will indirectly provide support to the Cuban government, but that could work against the regime as well if the people realize that improvements in their living conditions are not the result of communism, but from the interaction with the capitalist world. There is a sound reason for unilaterally lifting the trade and travel embargoes without first seeing positive actions from the Cuban government. From Cuba expert Carlos A. Saladrigas, Co-Chairman, Cuba Study Group, “We can go back in the history -- in the 50-year history of United States-Cuba relations and clearly see that any time we begin to see a little bit of relaxation of tensions in the relationship, whenever we begin to see a little bit of openness on the part of the United States or Cuba, historically the Cuban government has done something to counteract that trend and significantly revert back to their playbook.” 40 The United States needs to take the initiative away from the Castro regime, and have them react to actions they have publicly called for (removal of the embargo), but in reality are unsure of the second and third order effects and their ability to control the outcome. One of the first problems for the Cuban government after the removal of the embargo will be the excuse for the poor performing economy. “… the embargo and the United States policy of confrontation and isolation have been incredibly useful to the Cuban regime as an alibi for the failures of the regime to meet the fundamental needs of the people on the island, but also is a significant source of legitimacy, both internal and external.” 41 This situation may present the United States with the opportunity to step in to assist with market reforms if the Cuban economy sputters and the government realizes they don’t have a scapegoat. Conclusion The efforts expended by the United States to keep the embargo effective, the loss of trade, and the loss of soft power in most of the world are clearly not worth it in comparison to the threat that Cuba poses today. The gains to be achieved by following any path other than the unilateral removal of the economic and travel embargoes are small in comparison to the overall costs of continuing the current failed policy. The United States is losing far too much soft power in its efforts to punish and isolate the government of Cuba. American firms could be left out of any economic gains as Cuba continues to grow its economy. As Cuba emerges from the economic difficulties of the last two decades, the United States has an opportunity to influence the future direction of our southern neighbor. The current United States policy has many passionate defenders, and their criticism of the Castro regime is justified. Nevertheless, we must recognize the ineffectiveness of our current policy and deal with the Cuban regime in a way that enhances United States interests.42 The United States cannot afford to miss out on the window of opportunity to affect a positive change in the relationship with Cuba. If Cuba is able to continue on a path of economic progress and emerge once again as a true regional power, with communism intact, the United States will be the loser in this half century struggle. Cuba is spreading its limited influence to Venezuela, Honduras, Nicaragua, and will be ready to bring in any other countries in the Americas that want to move away from the United States orbit. The United States can’t stand by and watch Cuba regain strength, intact as a communist country, but must take this opportunity to create an inflection point for Cuba that guides her onto a path that will benefit the nations of the

#### Plan removes the biggest “crutch” of Cuban economic dependency

CSG ’13 (Cuba Study Group, Restoring Executive Authority Over U.S. Policy Toward Cuba February 2013, http://www.cubastudygroup.org/index.cfm/files/serve?File\_id=45d8f827-174c-4d43-aa2f-ef7794831032)

The primary consequences of Helms-Burton and related statutory provisions have been to isolate the United States from Cuba and to serve as a political scapegoat for the Cuban government’s many failures. It has become a “Great Crutch” to all sides of the Cuba debate. First, for ordinary Cubans, their struggle has fallen hostage to an international dispute between their government and the United States, which they see themselves as powerless to affect. For the Cuban leadership, it has become easier to blame the embargo than to adopt the difficult reforms needed to fix their economy. Lastly, for defenders of the status-quo within the Cuban-American community, it has become easier to wait for the United States to solve our national problem rather than engage in the difficult and necessary processes of reconciliation and reunification. Helms-Burton indiscriminately impacts all sectors of Cuban society, including democracy advocates and private entrepreneurs, causing disproportionate economic damage to the most vulnerable segments of the population. Conditioning our policy of resource denial on sweeping political reforms has only served to strengthen the Cuban government. The scarce resources available in an authoritarian Cuba have been and continue to be allocated primarily based on political priorities, thereby increasing the state’s relative power and its ability to control its citizens. The majority of American voters, Cuban-Americans and Cuban democracy advocates in the Island have rejected isolation as an element of U.S. policy toward Cuba and have called on the U.S. government to implement a policy of greater contact and exchange with Cuban society.ii As Cuba undergoes a slow and uncertain process of reforms, the continued existence of blanket U.S. sanctions only hinders the types of political reforms that Helms-Burton demands. Instead of maintaining a rigid policy that ties our hands and obsesses over hurting the Cuban leadership, U.S. policymakers should adopt a results-oriented policy that focuses primarily on empowering the Cuban people while simultaneously pressing the Cuban government to cease its repressive practices and respect fundamental human www.CubaStudyGroup.org 3 rights. Repealing Helms-Burton would also free civil society development and assistance programs to be implemented outside of a contentious sanctions framework. Furthermore, the Cuba Study Group believes that any forthcoming congressional review of current legislation relating to Cuba, such as a review of the Cuban Adjustment Act, must require a review of the totality of the legislative framework codified in Helms-Burton and related statutory provisions so that the United States may finally develop a coherent policy toward the Island.

#### Collapse leads to extinction

**Yoo 2005** – professor of law at UC Berkeley School of Law, visiting scholar at AEI (John, Northwestern University International Colloquium, “Failed states”, http://www.law.northwestern.edu/colloquium/international/Yoo.pdf, WEA)

Failed states pose perhaps the most dangerous threat to both American national security and international peace and stability. Failed states have served as the incubator of international terrorist groups, such as the al Qaeda organization that attacked the United States on September 11, 2001, or as trans-shipments points for illicit drugs, human trafficking, or the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction technologies. In Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, and the former Yugoslavia, failed states have produced the catastrophic human rights disasters. Since the end of World War II, far more lives have been lost due to internal wars than international armed conflicts, and many of the former have occurred in failed states. Military intervention in response, often led by the United States and its allies, incurs high costs in terms of money, material, and lives. Finding a comprehensive and effective solution to these challenges of terrorism, human rights violations, or poverty and lack of economic development requires some answers to the problem of failed states.

#### Independently increases risk of terrorism and makes conflicts in hotspots around the globe more likely

**Gorrell, 5 -** Lieutenant Colonel, US Army, paper submitted for the USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT (Tim, “CUBA: THE NEXT UNANTICIPATED ANTICIPATED STRATEGIC CRISIS?” <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA433074>

Regardless of the succession, under the current U.S. policy, Cuba’s problems of a post Castro transformation only worsen. In addition to Cubans on the island, there will be those in exile who will return claiming authority. And there are remnants of the dissident community within Cuba who will attempt to exercise similar authority. A power vacuum or absence of order will create the conditions for instability and civil war. Whether Raul or another successor from within the current government can hold power is debatable. However, that individual will nonetheless extend the current policies for an indefinite period, which will only compound the Cuban situation. When Cuba finally collapses anarchy is a strong possibility if the U.S. maintains the “wait and see” approach. The U.S. then must deal with an unstable country 90 miles off its coast. In the midst of this chaos, thousands will flee the island. During the Mariel boatlift in 1980 125,000 fled the island.26 Many were criminals; this time the number could be several hundred thousand fleeing to the U.S., creating a refugee crisis. Equally important, by adhering to a negative containment policy, the U.S. may be creating its next series of transnational criminal problems. Cuba is along the axis of the drug-trafficking flow into the U.S. from Columbia. The Castro government as a matter of policy does not support the drug trade. In fact, Cuba’s actions have shown that its stance on drugs is more than hollow rhetoric as indicated by its increasing seizure of drugs – 7.5 tons in 1995, 8.8 tons in 1999, and 13 tons in 2000.27 While there may be individuals within the government and outside who engage in drug trafficking and a percentage of drugs entering the U.S. may pass through Cuba, the Cuban government is not the path of least resistance for the flow of drugs. If there were no Cuban restraints, the flow of drugs to the U.S. could be greatly facilitated by a Cuba base of operation and accelerate considerably. In the midst of an unstable Cuba, the opportunity for radical fundamentalist groups to operate in the region increases. If these groups can export terrorist activity from Cuba to the U.S. or throughout the hemisphere then the war against this extremism gets more complicated. Such activity could increase direct attacks and disrupt the economies, threatening the stability of the fragile democracies that are budding throughout the region. In light of a failed state in the region, the U.S. may be forced to deploy military forces to Cuba, creating the conditions for another insurgency. The ramifications of this action could very well fuel greater anti-American sentiment throughout the Americas. A proactive policy now can mitigate these potential future problems. U.S. domestic political support is also turning against the current negative policy. The Cuban American population in the U.S. totals 1,241,685 or 3.5% of the population.28 Most of these exiles reside in Florida; their influence has been a factor in determining the margin of victory in the past two presidential elections. But this election strategy may be flawed, because recent polls of Cuban Americans reflect a decline for President Bush based on his policy crackdown. There is a clear softening in the Cuban-American community with regard to sanctions. Younger Cuban Americans do not necessarily subscribe to the hard-line approach. These changes signal an opportunity for a new approach to U.S.-Cuban relations. (Table 1) The time has come to look realistically at the Cuban issue. Castro will rule until he dies. The only issue is what happens then? The U.S. can little afford to be distracted by a failed state 90 miles off its coast. The administration, given the present state of world affairs, does not have the luxury or the resources to pursue the traditional American model of crisis management. The President and other government and military leaders have warned that the GWOT will be long and protracted. These warnings were sounded when the administration did not anticipate operations in Iraq consuming so many military, diplomatic and economic resources. There is justifiable concern that Africa and the Caucasus region are potential hot spots for terrorist activity, so these areas should be secure. North Korea will continue to be an unpredictable crisis in waiting. We also cannot ignore China. What if China resorts to aggression to resolve the Taiwan situation? Will the U.S. go to war over Taiwan? Additionally, Iran could conceivably be the next target for U.S. pre-emptive action. These are known and potential situations that could easily require all or many of the elements of national power to resolve. In view of such global issues, can the U.S. afford to sustain the status quo and simply let the Cuban situation play out? The U.S. is at a crossroads: should the policies of the past 40 years remain in effect with vigor? Or should the U.S. pursue a new approach to Cuba in an effort to facilitate a manageable transition to post-Castro Cuba?

**Terror’s extremely probable and nuclear use causes extinction.**

**Hellman, 08** [Martin E. Hellman, Professor @ Stanford, “Risk Analysis of Nuclear Deterrence” SPRING 2008 THE BENT OF TAU BETA PI, http://www.nuclearrisk.org/paper.pdf]

The threat of nuclear terrorism looms much larger in the public’s mind than the threat of a full-scale nuclear war, yet this article focuses primarily on the latter. An explanation is therefore in order before proceeding. A terrorist attack involving a nuclear weapon would be a catastrophe of immense proportions: “A 10-kiloton bomb detonated at Grand Central Station on a typical work day would likely kill some half a million people, and inflict over a trillion dollars in direct economic damage. America and its way of life would be changed forever.” [Bunn 2003, pages viii-ix]. The likelihood of such an attack is also significant. Former Secretary of Defense William Perry has estimated the chance of a nuclear terrorist incident within the next decade to be roughly 50 percent [Bunn 2007, page 15]. David Albright, a former weapons inspector in Iraq, estimates those odds at less than one percent, but notes, “We would never accept a situation where the chance of a major nuclear accident like Chernobyl would be anywhere near 1% .... A nuclear terrorism attack is a low-probability event, but we can’t live in a world where it’s anything but extremely low-probability.” [Hegland 2005]. In a survey of 85 national security experts, Senator Richard Lugar found a median estimate of 20 percent for the “probability of an attack involving a nuclear explosion occurring somewhere in the world in the next 10 years,” with 79 percent of the respondents believing “it more likely to be carried out by terrorists” than by a government [Lugar 2005, pp. 14-15]. I support increased efforts to reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism, but that is not inconsistent with the approach of this article. Because terrorism is one of the potential trigger mechanisms for a full-scale nuclear war, the risk analyses proposed herein will include estimating the risk of nuclear terrorism as one component of the overall risk. If that risk, the overall risk, or both are found to be unacceptable, then the proposed remedies would be directed to reduce which- ever risk(s) warrant attention. Similar remarks apply to a number of other threats (e.g., nuclear war between the U.S. and China over Taiwan). his article would be incomplete if it only dealt with the threat of nuclear terrorism and neglected the threat of full- scale nuclear war. If both risks are unacceptable, an effort to reduce only the terrorist component would leave humanity in great peril. In fact, society’s almost total neglect of the threat of full-scale nuclear war makes studying that risk all the more important. The cosT of World War iii The danger associated with nuclear deterrence depends on both the cost of a failure and the failure rate.3 This section explores the cost of a failure of nuclear deterrence, and the next section is concerned with the failure rate. While other definitions are possible, this article defines a failure of deterrence to mean a full-scale exchange of all nuclear weapons available to the U.S. and Russia, an event that will be termed World War III. Approximately 20 million people died as a result of the first World War. World War II’s fatalities were double or triple that number—chaos prevented a more precise deter- mination. In both cases humanity recovered, and the world today bears few scars that attest to the horror of those two wars. Many people therefore implicitly believe that a third World War would be horrible but survivable, an extrapola- tion of the effects of the first two global wars. In that view, World War III, while horrible, is something that humanity may just have to face and from which it will then have to recover. In contrast, some of those most qualified to assess the situation hold a very different view. In a 1961 speech to a joint session of the Philippine Con- gress, General Douglas MacArthur, stated, “Global war has become a Frankenstein to destroy both sides. … If you lose, you are annihilated. If you win, you stand only to lose. No longer does it possess even the chance of the winner of a duel. It contains now only the germs of double suicide.” Former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara ex- pressed a similar view: “If deterrence fails and conflict develops, the present U.S. and NATO strategy carries with it a high risk that Western civilization will be destroyed” [McNamara 1986, page 6]. More recently, George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn4 echoed those concerns when they quoted President Reagan’s belief that nuclear weapons were “totally irrational, totally inhu- mane, good for nothing but killing, possibly destructive of life on earth and civilization.” [Shultz 2007] Official studies, while couched in less emotional terms, still convey the horrendous toll that World War III would exact: “The resulting deaths would be far beyond any precedent. Executive branch calculations show a range of U.S. deaths from 35 to 77 percent (i.e., 79-160 million dead) … a change in targeting could kill somewhere between 20 million and 30 million additional people on each side .... These calculations reflect only deaths during the first 30 days. Additional millions would be injured, and many would eventually die from lack of adequate medical care … millions of people might starve or freeze during the follow- ing winter, but it is not possible to estimate how many. … further millions … might eventually die of latent radiation effects.” [OTA 1979, page 8] This OTA report also noted the possibility of serious ecological damage [OTA 1979, page 9], a concern that as- sumed a new potentiality when the TTAPS report [TTAPS 1983] proposed that the ash and dust from so many nearly simultaneous nuclear explosions and their resultant fire- storms could usher in a nuclear winter that might erase homo sapiens from the face of the earth, much as many scientists now believe the K-T Extinction that wiped out the dinosaurs resulted from an impact winter caused by ash and dust from a large asteroid or comet striking Earth. The TTAPS report produced a heated debate, and there is still no scientific consensus on whether a nuclear winter would follow a full-scale nuclear war. Recent work [Robock 2007, Toon 2007] suggests that even a limited nuclear exchange or one between newer nuclear-weapon states, such as India and Pakistan, could have devastating long-lasting climatic consequences due to the large volumes of smoke that would be generated by fires in modern megacities. While it is uncertain how destructive World War III would be, prudence dictates that we apply the same engi- neering conservatism that saved the Golden Gate Bridge from collapsing on its 50th anniversary and assume that preventing World War III is a necessity—not an option.

#### Hotspots escalate into nuclear conflict and extinction

Bosco 06- a senior editor at Foreign Policy magazine (David July 06 “Forum: Keeping an eye peeled for World War III” <http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/06211/709477-109.stm_>)

The understanding that small but violent acts can spark global conflagration is etched into the world's consciousness. The reverberations from Princip's shots in the summer of 1914 ultimately took the lives of more than 10 million people, shattered four empires and dragged more than two dozen countries into war. This hot summer, as the world watches the violence in the Middle East, the awareness of peace's fragility is particularly acute. The bloodshed in Lebanon appears to be part of a broader upsurge in unrest. Iraq is suffering through one of its bloodiest months since the U.S.-led invasion in 2003. Taliban militants are burning schools and attacking villages in southern Afghanistan as the United States and NATO struggle to defend that country's fragile government. Nuclear-armed India is still cleaning up the wreckage from a large terrorist attack in which it suspects militants from rival Pakistan. The world is awash in weapons, North Korea and Iran are developing nuclear capabilities, and long-range missile technology is spreading like a virus. Some see the start of a global conflict. "We're in the early stages of what I would describe as the Third World War," former House Speaker Newt Gingrich said recently. Certain religious Web sites are abuzz with talk of Armageddon. There may be as much hyperbole as prophecy in the forecasts for world war. But it's not hard to conjure ways that today's hot spots could ignite.

Consider the following scenarios:

* Targeting Iran: As Israeli troops seek out and destroy Hezbollah forces in southern Lebanon, intelligence officials spot a shipment of longer-range Iranian missiles heading for Lebanon. The Israeli government decides to strike the convoy and Iranian nuclear facilities simultaneously. After Iran has recovered from the shock, Revolutionary Guards surging across the border into Iraq, bent on striking Israel's American allies. Governments in Syria, Jordan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia face violent street protests demanding retribution against Israel -- and they eventually yield, triggering a major regional war.
* Missiles away: With the world's eyes on the Middle East, North Korea's Kim Jong Il decides to continue the fireworks show he began earlier this month. But this time his brinksmanship pushes events over the brink. A missile designed to fall into the sea near Japan goes astray and hits Tokyo, killing a dozen civilians. Incensed, the United States, Japan's treaty ally, bombs North Korean missile and nuclear sites. North Korean artillery batteries fire on Seoul, and South Korean and U.S. troops respond. Meanwhile, Chinese troops cross the border from the north to stem the flow of desperate refugees just as U.S. troops advance from the south. Suddenly, the world's superpower and the newest great power are nose to nose.
* Loose nukes: Al-Qaida has had Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf in its sights for years, and the organization finally gets its man. Pakistan descends into chaos as militants roam the streets and the army struggles to restore order. India decides to exploit the vacuum and punish the Kashmir-based militants it blames for the recent Mumbai railway bombings. Meanwhile, U.S. special operations forces sent to secure Pakistani nuclear facilities face off against an angry mob.
* The empire strikes back: Pressure for democratic reform erupts in autocratic Belarus. As protesters mass outside the parliament in Minsk, president Alexander Lukashenko requests Russian support. After protesters are beaten and killed, they appeal for help, and neighboring Poland -- a NATO member with bitter memories of Soviet repression -- launches a humanitarian mission to shelter the regime's opponents. Polish and Russian troops clash, and a confrontation with NATO looms.

As in the run-up to other wars, there is today more than enough tinder lying around to spark a great power conflict. The question is how effective the major powers have become at managing regional conflicts and preventing them from escalating. After two world wars and the decades-long Cold War, what has the world learned about managing conflict? The end of the Cold War had the salutary effect of dialing down many regional conflicts. In the 1960s and 1970s, every crisis in the Middle East had the potential to draw in the superpowers in defense of their respective client states. The rest of the world was also part of the Cold War chessboard. Compare the almost invisible U.N. peacekeeping mission in Congo today to the deeply controversial mission there in the early 1960s. (The Soviets were convinced that the U.N. mission was supporting a U.S. puppet, and Russian diplomats stormed out of several Security Council meetings in protest.) From Angola to Afghanistan, nearly every Cold War conflict was a proxy war. Now, many local crises can be handed off to the humanitarians or simply ignored. But the end of the bipolar world has a downside. In the old days, the two competing superpowers sometimes reined in bellicose client states out of fear that regional conflicts would escalate. Which of the major powers today can claim to have such influence over Tehran or Pyongyang? Today's world has one great advantage: None of the leading powers appears determined to reorder international affairs as Germany was before both world wars and as Japan was in the years before World War II. True, China is a rapidly rising power -- an often destabilizing phenomenon in international relations -- but it appears inclined to focus on economic growth rather than military conquest (with the possible exception of Taiwan). Russia is resentful about its fall from superpower status, but it also seems reconciled to U.S. military dominance and more interested in tapping its massive oil and gas reserves than in rebuilding its decrepit military. Indeed, U.S. military superiority seems to be a key to global stability. Some theories of international relations predict that other major powers will eventually band together to challenge American might, but it's hard to find much evidence of such behavior. The United States, after all, invaded Iraq without U.N. approval and yet there was not even a hint that France, Russia or China would respond militarily.

**Contention 3 is solvency:**

#### Policy won’t change absent the plan

**Wilkinson, 13** – chair of the International Institute for the Study of Cuba (Stephen, “ What Will a New Generation of Leadership Mean for Cuba?” 3/6, <http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=3254>)

A: Stephen Wilkinson, chairman of the International Institute for the Study of Cuba: "This is a very challenging question to answer for any Cuba watcher because I think it is fair to say that the appointment of Miguel Díaz-Canel came as a surprise. He is not a person who was hitherto well-known. He traveled abroad very rarely and has had very little contact with the United States or foreign affairs. This means that it is almost impossible to predict what his appointment will mean. It is evident that he is the first person to hold the post of first vice-president who was born after the revolution. He is therefore a member of the generation that benefitted the most from the social advances that it made. He comes from a relatively modest background, and he is not a member of any of the prominent families that fought the revolution, nor is he a military figure. This might suggest that he has been carefully selected because in him it is very difficult to accuse the Cuban leadership of being nepotistic or dynastic, or of being militarized. His lack of prior contact with the United States is also important to consider. As an unknown quantity, he will be harder to influence or predict. He has an impeccable record as a party member, appears to be modest and is obviously extremely hard-working. I feel therefore that he will represent continuity rather than change. I believe talk of a significant generational switch is somewhat exaggerated. Even if he obtains the highest office, Díaz-Canel will still be surrounded for years by members of the generation that fought the revolution, many of whom are not as old as the Castros. Esteban Lazo Hernández for example, who has just taken over the presidency of the National Assembly, is 68 and fought in the revolution as boy. Even under the new two-term rule, he could still be in office in 2022! If anything, the lesson I would draw from this for the policymakers in Washington is to wake up to the fact that waiting for the Castros to die is a waste of time."

#### Normal Trade Relations is vital – no trade occurs without it

**French, 9** – editor of and a frequent contributor to The Havana Note. She has led more than two dozen research trips to Cuba (Anya, “Options for Engagement A Resource Guide for Reforming U.S. Policy toward Cuba” <http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/library/resources/documents/Cuba/USPolicy/options-for-engagement.pdf>)

the path to “normal” trade relations If the United States were to lift its trade embargo against Cuba, this would not automatically confer “normal” status to the bilateral trade relationship. It would mean that the United States and Cuba have the opportunity to begin trading in more goods and services than they have in the last fifty years. Whether much expanded trade actually occurs depends on whether the United States were to take additional steps beyond lifting the embargo: the most important of which is the provision of Normal Trade Relations (NTR). NTR is a technical term which refers to the provision of nondiscriminatory treatment toward trading partners. Cuba and North Korea are the only two countries to which the United States continues to deny “normal trade relations.” All other countries either have permanent normal trade relations or temporary, renewable normal trade relations with the United States.161 Assuming that the Cuba-specific trade sanctions contained in the Cuban Assets Control Regulations (the continuity of which was codified by the 1996 Helms-Burton Act) were to be eliminated, achieving normal trade relations between Cuba and the United States would not be a simple matter. A first stumbling block could be the 1974 Trade Act provision dubbed “Jackson-Vanik,” which prohibits non-market economy countries from receiving normal tariff treatment, entering into a bilateral commercial agreement, or receiving any U.S. government credits or loan guarantees, until the President has reported to Congress that such a country does not: 1) deny its citizens the right to emigrate, 2) impose an unreasonable tax or fine for emigrating, and 3) impose more than a “nominal tax, levy, fine, fee or other charge on any citizen as a consequence of the desire of such citizen to emigrate to the country of his choice.”162 Thus, Cuba’s restrictions on its citizens’ emigration rights pose an obstacle to normalization of bilateral trade. Only once the requirements set forth by the Jackson-Vanik amendment have been met, (and absent any other Cuba-specific sanctions, such as the Export Administration Act controls on countries found to be supporting international terrorism), could the United States begin negotiations of a bilateral commercial agreement with Cuba. To begin to extend normal trade relations to Cuba, the United States would need to enter into a reciprocal trade agreement with Cuba (not equivalent to a “free trade agreement”) that would provide a balance of trade benefits and protections to U.S. exports and commercial entities doing business with Cuba, at the same time it would provide such benefits to Cuba. Such an agreement would need to include protection for U.S. patents and trademarks and for “industrial rights and processes,” include a safeguard mechanism to prevent market disruptions due to trade, and provide that the agreement, and its continuation, be subject to the national security interests of both parties.163 Assuming bilateral relations had reached the appropriate milestones to begin discussing two-way trade, negotiating such an agreement could potentially take years, as both countries would need to adopt statutory and regulatory changes.

#### Unilateral lifting crucial - Cuba will use a condition to veto the plan

**Ratliff, 9 -** Research Fellow at the Independent Institute and a member of the Board of Advisors of the Institute’s Center on Global Prosperity. He is also a Research Fellow and Curator of the Americas Collection at the Hoover Institution(William, “Why and How to Lift the U.S. Embargo on Cuba”, 5/7,

http://www.independent.org/newsroom/article.asp?id=2496)

How has the embargo failed? It has not brought down the Castro brothers, advanced democracy, freedom, human rights or prosperity in Cuba, or gotten compensation for Americans whose assets Cuba seized decades ago. It largely denies Americans the freedom to travel to Cuba, or to trade freely and otherwise interact Cubans on the island. And in recent decades it has given Fidel the scapegoat he needs—us—to excuse his economic utopianism and brutality. Supporters of the embargo see it as an expression of America’s moral indignation at Castro’s brutal policies. By limiting the flow of dollars to Cuba we deny some funds to Cuban security forces, as they argue, but we simultaneously withhold support for the daily lives of the Cuban people. For twenty years the embargo placated the very noisy Cuban American community in Florida, but by late 2008 even a majority of Cuban Americans, according to a Florida International University poll, had turned against it. It isn’t that Cuban Americans are going soft on Fidel, but that a majority finally see or admit that this policy is more harmful than positive to its own interests. And it is harmful to U.S. interests as well, which ought to be our primary concern, alienating the Hemisphere and the world as a whole while having only negative impacts in Cuba. The Cuban American National Foundation, long the epicenter of anti-Castroism in the United States, recently admitted that for many years the embargo has been “little beyond posturing for domestic electoral purposes.” How can we best end this policy with a minimum of confrontation, frustration and delay? The only way we can keep full control of the process is by lifting it unilaterally. The State Department recently lauded the normalization of relations between Turkey and Armenia. “It has long been and remains the position of the United States that normalization should take place without preconditions,” State said. So why not between the United States and Cuba, where the pain of the past hardly equals that of Turkey and Armenia? Is Castro a brutal dictator? Sure, but his atrocities are hardly worse than those of Robert Mugabe, the thug who rules Zimbabwe, a country we recognize. The United States demands more concessions from Cuba for recognition than from any other country in history. In fact, the Helms Burton Act is blatantly imperialistic, in the spirit of the Platt Amendment to the Monroe Doctrine a century ago, which poisoned U.S. relations with Cuba for decades. Negotiations without preconditions, which Obama says he supports, are the next best though potentially deeply flawed approach. Informal discussions between U.S. and Cuban diplomats already are underway. If Cuban pragmatists, including President Raul Castro, can over-ride Fidel’s anti-American passions, perhaps the United States, if we are very flexible, and Cuba can work out a step-by-step, face-saving plan to reduce tensions and normalize relations. The Obama administration got off to a positive start by dropping the misguided 2004 Bush administration restrictions on remittances and travel to Cuba, but then in public statements fell immediately into the trap of previous administrations by demanding “reciprocity.” This seems a just and reasonable demand, but in the propaganda-filled public arena it is a game-stopper. In practical terms, the public demand for reciprocity hands Cuba a veto over U.S. policy, which it has used before to short-circuit emerging U.S. moderation. Cuba will never make tradeoffs on important matters so long as the core of the basically flawed embargo remains in place. Lifting the embargo would unleash a new dynamic and put full responsibility for Cuban rights violations and economic failure squarely on Cuba’s leaders where it belongs. We can hope, but can’t guarantee, that ending the embargo will encourage real domestic reforms in Cuba. We can guarantee that it will rid us of a demeaning, hypocritical and counterproductive policy.

# 2AC

**Easing the embargo stimulates U.S. economy – keeping it in place hurts businesses**

**Safran, 12** -Master of Science in Global Affairs (with distinction) at New York University

(Brian, “End the Cuban Embargo”, 2012, <http://brian-safran-4.quora.com/End-the-Cuban-Embargo-Brian-Safran>, google scholar) KW

Those that support the embargo often make the claim that as such a small Caribbean country, the economic advantage to be gained by the United States in lifting its embargo on Cuba would be negligible. This assertion is simply without merit, and the evidence proves it. A committee of former Department of Transportation economists recently noted that eradicating the embargo would add 1.6 billion dollars in revenue to the U.S. economy and establish approximately twenty thousand additional jobs in the U.S. (Weinmann, 2004, 29) Analysts have asserted that had the embargo been lifted, the Cuban people would have been able to use revenues derived from tourism to purchase significant amounts of machinery and agricultural products from the United States. (Griswold, 2005, 2) In fact, the American Farm Bureau has stated that the embargo has caused U.S. businesses to lose out on a major potential export market in agriculture which could have led American farmers to profits upwards of one billion dollars, and to an additional quarter million dollars per year in the exportation of farming machinery and accessories. (Griswold, 2005, 2) The passage of the 1992 Cuban Democracy Act, which banned all trade in foodstuffs to Cuba through U.S. subsidiaries, effectively deepening the Cuban depression, further served to damage U.S. agricultural business interests abroad. (Weinmann, 2004, 24; 29) In addition, the 1996 Helms-Burton Act, which allowed U.S. citizens, including those Cuban-Americans who had not been citizens at the time, to commence lawsuits against companies that had engaged in indirect business transactions with the Castro regime has had a crippling affect on a multitude of U.S. businesses. (Vanden, 2006, 360-61) In addition, the maintenance of the embargo requires a significant utilization of national security resources that can clearly be put to better use in protecting America from substantive terrorism threats rather than by using them to enforce an inconsequential ban on Cuban travel. (Weinmann, 2004, 30) Thus, from an economic standpoint, the United States does indeed have the potential to benefit from a liberalization of trade with Cuba.

#### Only unconditional affs are topical.

**Smith 5** — Karen E. Smith, Professor of International Relations and Director of the European Foreign Policy Unit at the London School of Economics, 2005 (“Engagement and conditionality: incompatible or mutually reinforcing?,” *Global Europe: New Terms of Engagement*, May, Available Online at http://fpc.org.uk/fsblob/484.pdf, Accessed 07-25-2013, p. 23)

First, a few definitions. ‘Engagement’ is a foreign policy strategy of building close ties with the government and/or civil society and/or business community of another state. The intention of this strategy is to undermine illiberal political and economic practices, and socialise government and other domestic actors into more liberal ways. Most cases of engagement entail primarily **building economic links**, and encouraging trade and investment in particular. Some observers have variously labelled this strategy one of interdependence, or of ‘oxygen’: economic activity leads to positive political consequences.19

‘Conditionality’, in contrast, is the linking, by a state or international organisation, of perceived benefits to another state (such as aid or trade concessions) to the fulfilment of economic and/or political conditions. ‘Positive conditionality’ entails promising benefits to a state if it fulfils the conditions; ‘negative conditionality’ involves reducing, suspending, or terminating those benefits if the state violates the conditions (in other words, applying sanctions, or a strategy of ‘asphyxiation’).20 To put it simply, **engagement implies ties, but with no strings attached**; **conditionality attaches the strings**. In another way of looking at it, engagement is **more of a bottom-up strategy** to induce change in another country, conditionality **more of a top-down strategy**.

**The alternative triggers war.**

**Doran 99** (Charles, Professor of International Relations at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies, Survival, 1999, Summer, p. 148-9, proquest)

The conclusion, then, is that the probability of major war declines for some states, but increases for others. And it is very difficult to argue that it has disappeared in any significant or reliable or hopeful sense. Moreover, a problem with arguing a position that might be described as utopian is that such arguments have policy implications. It is worrying that as a thesis about the obsolescence of major war becomes more compelling to more people, including presumably governments, the tendency will be to forget about the underlying problem, which is not war per se, but security. And by neglecting the underlying problem of security, the probability of war perversely increases: as governments fail to provide the kind of defence and security necessary to maintain deterrence, one opens up the possibility of new challenges. In this regard it is worth recalling one of Clauswitz's most important insights: A conqueror is always a lover of peace. He would like to make his entry into our state unopposed. That is the underlying dilemma when one argues that a major war is not likely to occur and, as a consequence, one need not necessarily be so concerned about providing the defences that underlie security itself. History shows that surprise threats emerge and rapid destabilising efforts are made to try to provide that missing defence, and all of this contributes to the spiral of uncertainty that leads in the end to war.

**Insecurity and disorder aren’t inevitable**

**Kurasawa, 04** (Professor of Sociology, York University of Toronto, Fuyuki, Constellations Volume 11, No 4, 2004).

Moreover, keeping in mind the sobering lessons of the past century cannot but make us wary about humankind’s supposedly unlimited ability for problemsolving or discovering solutions in time to avert calamities. In fact, the historical track-record of last-minute, technical ‘quick-fixes’ is hardly reassuring. What’s more, most of the serious perils that we face today (e.g., nuclear waste, climate change, global terrorism, genocide and civil war) demand complex, sustained, long-term strategies of planning, coordination, and execution. On the other hand, an examination of fatalism makes it readily apparent that the idea that humankind is doomed from the outset puts off any attempt to minimize risks for our successors, essentially condemning them to face cataclysms unprepared. An a priori pessimism is also unsustainable given the fact that long-term preventive action has had (and will continue to have) appreciable beneficial effects; the examples of medical research, the welfare state, international humanitarian law, as well as strict environmental regulations in some countries stand out among many others. The evaluative framework proposed above should not be restricted to the critique of misappropriations of farsightedness, since it can equally support public deliberation with a reconstructive intent, that is, democratic discussion and debate about a future that human beings would freely self-determine. Inverting Foucault’s Nietzschean metaphor, we can think of genealogies of the future that could perform a farsighted mapping out of the possible ways of organizing social life. They are, in other words, interventions into the present intended to facilitate global civil society’s participation in shaping the field of possibilities of what is to come. Once competing dystopian visions are filtered out on the basis of their analytical credibility, ethical commitments, and political underpinnings and consequences, groups and individuals can assess the remaining legitimate catastrophic scenarios through the lens of genealogical mappings of the future. Hence, our first duty consists in addressing the present-day causes of eventual perils, ensuring that the paths we decide upon do not contract the range of options available for our posterity.42 Just as importantly, the practice of genealogically inspired farsightedness nurtures the project of an autonomous future, one that is socially self-instituting. In so doing, we can acknowledge that the future is a human creation instead of the product of metaphysical and extra-social forces (god, nature, destiny, etc.), and begin to reflect upon and deliberate about the kind of legacy we want to leave for those who will follow us. Participants in global civil society can then take – and in many instances have already taken – a further step by committing themselves to socio-political struggles forging a world order that, aside from not jeopardizing human and environmental survival, is designed to rectify the sources of transnational injustice that will continue to inflict needless suffering upon future generations if left unchallenged.

**The economy cannot be securitized – there is no friend/enemy distinction in the economic sector**

**William 3** (Michael C., Chairholder in the Faculty Research Chair in International Politics, professor in the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Ottawa “Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics”, *International Studies Quarterly*, [http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/10.1046/j.0020-8833.2003.00277.x/full)//AMV](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/10.1046/j.0020-8833.2003.00277.x/full)/AMV)

A second of McSweeny’s criticisms illustrates the point equally well. McSweeny argues that if an a priori, unified understanding of society as concerned with identity were set aside, and researchers went out and actually asked what individuals in society saw as their primary security concerns, they would find that questions of economic welfare rather than issues of social identity were preeminent (1999:72). While this is clearly to a degree an empirical question, and one undoubtedly likely to vary enormously in different contexts, it serves also to highlight the affinities of the Copenhagen School with Schmittian themes. From the perspective of securitization theory, economic well-being is not a ‘‘security’’ issue unless it is placed within the categories (and successful speech-acts) of existential threat. **The uncontested fact that economic deprivation is a severe threat to life does not mean that it is capable of being effectively cast as a security issue**. Only if this issue could be securitized (cast, as I have argued, in terms of friends and enemies) would it become so. For a variety of reasons (the abstractness of markets, and the individualized and intrinsically ‘‘risky’’ nature of capitalism among them), the Copenhagen School does not think that such a process is likely to succeed.25 This does not, to repeat, mean that economic factors are not crucial to human life and well-being, or that economic factors may not be crucial in fostering processes of securitization; but it does mean that unless dynamics of deprivation generate effective mobilization as threats, and thereby collective support for decisions of threat that are the hallmarks of securitization, **they remain distinct from issues of security.**26

**Changing discourse doesn’t eliminate security dilemmas**

**Copeland, 2000** (Dale, professor of government at University of Virginia, International Security 25:2, Fall 2000, ingenta)

Although the road ahead for Wendt’s neoconstructivism is still long, Social Theory of International Politics provides a solid constructivist vehicle for travel-ing it. The book allows scholars to differentiate clearly between truly material and ideational explanations, and between accounts that emphasize the role of states as actors and those that incorporate transnational forces and divisions within polities. It has reinforced the importance of diplomacy as a tool for re-ducing high levels of misunderstanding that can impede cooperation. Yet by bracketing off domestic processes, Wendt has overlooked the irony of constructivism: that the mutability of human ideational structures at the do-mestic level reinforces leaders’ great uncertainty about future intentions at the interstate level. The security dilemma, with all its implications, is real and per-vasive. It cannot be talked away through better discursive practices. It must be faced.

**Turn—rejecting strategic predictions of threats makes them inevitable**

**Fitzsimmons, 2007** [Michael, Washington DC defense analyst, “The Problem of Uncertainty in Strategic Planning”, Survival, Winter 06-07, online]

But handling even this weaker form of uncertainty is still quite challeng- ing. If not sufficiently bounded, a high degree of variability in planning factors can exact a significant price on planning. The complexity presented by great variability strains the cognitive abilities of even the most sophisticated decision- makers.15 And even a robust decision-making process sensitive to cognitive limitations necessarily sacrifices depth of analysis for breadth as variability and complexity grows. It should follow, then, that in planning under conditions of risk, variability in strategic calculation should be carefully tailored to available analytic and decision processes. Why is this important? What harm can an imbalance between complexity and cognitive or analytic capacity in strategic planning bring? Stated simply, where analysis is silent or inadequate, the personal beliefs of decision-makers fill the void. As political scientist Richard Betts found in a study of strategic sur- prise, in ‘an environment that lacks clarity, abounds with conflicting data, and allows no time for rigorous assessment of sources and validity, ambiguity allows intuition or wishfulness to drive interpretation ... The greater the ambiguity, the greater the impact of preconceptions.’16 The decision-making environment that Betts describes here is one of political-military crisis, not long-term strategic planning. But a strategist who sees uncertainty as the central fact of his environ- ment brings upon himself some of the pathologies of crisis decision-making. He invites ambiguity, takes conflicting data for granted and substitutes a priori scepticism about the validity of prediction for time pressure as a rationale for discounting the importance of analytic rigour. It is important not to exaggerate the extent to which data and ‘rigorous assessment’ can illuminate strategic choices. Ambiguity is a fact of life, and scepticism of analysis is necessary. Accordingly, the intuition and judgement of decision-makers will always be vital to strategy, and attempting to subordinate those factors to some formulaic, deterministic decision-making model would be both undesirable and unrealistic. All the same, there is danger in the opposite extreme as well. Without careful analysis of what is relatively likely and what is relatively unlikely, what will be the possible bases for strategic choices? A decision-maker with no faith in prediction is left with little more than a set of worst-case scenarios and his existing beliefs about the world to confront the choices before him. Those beliefs may be more or less well founded, but if they are not made explicit and subject to analysis and debate regarding their application to particular strategic contexts, they remain only beliefs and premises, rather than rational judgements. Even at their best, such decisions are likely to be poorly understood by the organisations charged with their implementation. At their worst, such decisions may be poorly understood by the decision-makers themselves.

**Threats are real**

**Kurasawa 4**

(Fuyuki Kurasawa, Associate Professor of Sociology at York University in Toronto, Canada, 2004, Constellations Vol 11, No 4, 2004, Cautionary Tales: The Global Culture of Prevention and the Work of Foresight <http://www.yorku.ca/kurasawa/Kurasawa%20Articles/Constellations%20Article.pdf>)

In addition**,** farsightedness has become a priority in world affairs due to the appearance of new global threats and the resurgence of ‘older’ ones. Virulent forms of ethno-racial nationalismand religious fundamentalismthat had mostly been kept in check or bottled up duringthe Cold War have reasserted themselves in ways that are now all-too-familiar – civil warfare, genocide, ‘ethnic cleansing,’ and global terrorism. And if nuclear mutually assured destruction has come to pass, other dangers are filling the vacuum: climate change, AIDS and other diseases (BSE, SARS, etc.), as well as previously unheralded genomic perils (genetically modified organisms, human cloning). Collective remembrance of past atrocities and disasters has galvanized some sectors of public opinion and made the international community’s unwillingness to adequately intervene before and during the genocides in the ex-Yugoslavia and Rwanda, or to take remedial steps in the case of the spiraling African and Asian AIDS pandemics, appear particularly glaring. Returning to the point I made at the beginning of this paper, the significance of foresight is a direct outcome of the transition toward a dystopian imaginary(or what Sontag has called “the imagination of disaster”).11 Huxley’s Brave New World and Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four, two groundbreaking dystopiannovels of the first half of the twentieth century, remain as influential as ever in framing public discourse and understanding current techno-scientific dangers, while recent paradigmatic cultural artifacts – films like The Matrix and novels like Atwood’s Oryx and Crake – reflect and give shape to this catastrophic sensibility.12 And yet dystopianism need not imply despondency, paralysis, or fear. Quite the opposite, in fact, since the pervasiveness of a dystopian imaginary can help notions of historical contingency and fallibilism gain traction against their determinist and absolutist counterparts.13 Once we recognize that the future is uncertain and that any course of action produces both unintended and unexpected consequences, the responsibility to face up to potential disasters and intervene before they strike becomes compelling. From another angle, dystopianism lies at the core of politics in a global civil society where groups mobilize their ownnightmare scenarios (‘Frankenfoods’ and a lifeless planet for environmentalists, totalitarian patriarchy of the sort depicted in Atwood’s Handmaid’s Tale for Western feminism, McWorld and a global neoliberal oligarchy for the alternative globalization movement, etc.). Such scenarios can act as catalysts for public debate and socio-political action**,** spurring citizens’ involvement in the work of preventive foresight.

#### Price decline inevitable

**Penn Energy 8/22** – News agency that reports the latest energy industry news and research for oil and gas, power generation and renewable energy, cites empirics, the EIA, and the August Short-Term Energy Outlook, (Editorial Staff, August 22, 2013, “EIA: Brent crude oil prices to decline through end of 2013”, <http://www.pennenergy.com/articles/pennenergy/2013/08/eia-brent-crude-oil-prices-to-decline-through-end-of-2013.html)//HH>

Disruptions to global crude oil and liquid fuels production reached nearly 2.7 million barrels per day (bbl/d) in July 2013 (Figure 1), the highest level since at least January 2009. During this same period, global refinery crude oil runs reached their expected 2013 peak. Combined, these developments helped push Brent spot prices to an average of $108 per barrel in July, above the $102-$103-per-barrel average from April through June.

However, this upward price movement was likely muted in part by growing non-OPEC supply in other regions, including growing U.S. production that has reduced U.S. imports of crude oil and in so doing released more barrels from global suppliers to other markets. Through the end of the third quarter and into the fourth quarter, EIA expects that continued rising non-OPEC production combined with seasonally decreasing demand from refiners will put downward pressure on Brent prices. In the August Short-Term Energy Outlook (STEO), EIA projects the Brent spot price will average $104 per barrel in September, and $102 per barrel in the fourth quarter.

Disruptions to production in Iraq and Libya have had a significant effect over the summer, reducing crude supplies, particularly into the Mediterranean market, an important market for Brent-priced crude oils. In Iraq, persistent attacks on the pipeline from Kirkuk to Ceyhan in Turkey helped push total Iraqi production disruptions to about 290,000 bbl/d in July, up 60,000 bbl/d from June. In Libya, ongoing labor-related protests at several oil production facilities boosted outages, thereby reducing production to 1.0 million bbl/d in July, down from 1.5 million bbl/d in April. Additional deterioration in the security environment in Iraq or Libya could further reduce OPEC production in the short term. In Nigeria, crude exports were reduced during July and August as deliveries of the country's Bonny Light grade were disrupted by work on key pipelines.

Outages in non-OPEC member countries as well as record-high global refinery runs also tightened crude supplies and contributed to higher crude oil prices. The International Energy Agency (IEA) reported that global refinery runs were 78.3 million bbl/d in July, up from an average of 74.8 million bbl/d in the second quarter. The IEA expects global runs to remain at a fairly hefty 77.4 million bbl/d in August. From a supply standpoint, disruptions to non-OPEC production averaged about 800,000 bbl/d, most of which occurred in Sudan and South Sudan, Yemen, and Syria, and which were largely already priced into market expectations. However, unanticipated flood-related disruptions in Canada, mostly affecting North American inland markets, contributed almost a quarter of the total non-OPEC outages.

The tightness in light sweet crude oil supply resulting from the combination of production outages and increased refinery runs is most readily apparent in the absolute price levels of Brent crude oil. However, it is also evident in the Urals differential, the price of Urals crude oil compared with that of Brent. Urals, a Russian crude oil, competes in European markets with many Brent-priced crude oils. The Urals differential for crude oil delivered into the Mediterranean market moved from an average $0.48 per barrel below Brent in June to an increasingly larger premium to Brent for much of July and the first weeks of August, reaching a $2.76-per-barrel premium versus Brent on August 8. The Urals price was also supported by high refinery runs in the former Soviet Union, mostly Russia, which increased from 6.2 million bbl/d in April to 7.1 million bbl/d in August, reducing supplies available for export.

In September, an expected reduction in refinery purchases of crude oil should help to relieve upward pressure on prices even as production outages continue. The IEA expects global crude oil runs to fall to 76.2 million bbl/d in September and to 75.9 million bbl/d in October. As refiners typically schedule crude purchases one to two months in advance of actual processing, short-term refiner demand for crude is likely to taper off. Likewise, EIA projects non-OPEC liquid fuels production, predominantly crude oil, will increase through the end of 2013, with fourth-quarter production averaging 55.0 million bbl/d, increases of 0.7 million bbl/d and 1.3 million bbl/d from the third and second quarters of 2013, respectively.

#### China solves Russian oil prices

**RT 9/10** – a Russian news channel which brings the Russian view on global news, cites empirics, (RT Business, September 10, 2013, “PetroChina considering $10 billion Russian gas investment”, http://rt.com/business/china-russia-gas-investment-647/)//HH

China’s state-owned gas major is reportedly examining a $10 billion investment in Russian gas fields. If realised, the deal would mark PetroChina’s biggest purchase abroad.

PetroChina, a branch of the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), is looking to spend at least $10 billion to pick up a minority share in Rosneft and Gazprom-operated gas fields in Siberia, Bloomberg reported, citing its sources.

The two countries are seeking to complete a deal that would see Russia supply as much as 68 billion cubic meters of gas a year, helping to meet the energy needs of Asia’s biggest economy.

People close to the deal said the oil field acquisition has been in the works for nearly 10 years.

A slump in European demand has made China, the world’s biggest consumer, a key trade partner for Russia, which has the world’s largest natural resources reserves. In March Russian state-owned oil major Rosneft said it would triple supplies to China to 1 million barrels a day.

This is just the latest in a string of China-Russia energy negotiations, with an unprecedented $270 billion Rosneft oil deal announced in June and a 38 billion cubic meter per year Gazprom gas supply deal signed at the G20 summit in St. Petersburg.

Oil producers from the Middle East, Russia, Africa and Latin America are all competing for a bigger share of China's growing market as demand for imported oil falls in the US and Europe, and Russia seems to be ahead in the race.

Already a dominant force in Iraqi oil fields, PetroChina is also in talks with Lukoil, Russia’s largest private oil company, to develop the West Qurna field, which could potentially produce 500,000 barrels of oil in 2014.

#### Russia not dependent on oil

**Melik, 12** – BBC Reporter (James, “Russia Moves to Diversify Economy With Energy Projects”, BBC, 7/4/12, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-18622834>)

**Twenty miles west of Moscow, a new technology race, rather like the space race of the 1960s, is opening up.**In the area of farmland, Russia is trying to build its own version of Silicon Valley - the Skolkovo Innovation Centre. It is part of the government initiative to **divert the country away from its economic dependence on oil** and gas and towards a new kind of industry. It has been a key policy for Dmitry Medvedev, the man who was Russia's president until he was replaced by Vladimir Putin at the beginning of May 2012.The Skolkovo project is widely criticised in Russia and construction work has still not started in earnest more than two years after the proposals was announced.Another aim of this proposed technology drive is to keep clever Russians in the country, along with their money-making ideas, rather than them leaving because they are fed up with corruption and the weight of bureaucracy.

#### Link non-unique – the US already lifted agricultural sanctions against Cuba

**Perales et al. 10** – Senior Program Associate of the Latin American Program at the Wilson Center (José Raúl, “The United States and Cuba: Implications of an Economic Relationship,” Wilson Center, August 2010, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/LAP\_Cuba\_Implications.pdf)//Bwang

The last decade has been marked by a significant growth in economic ties between the United States and Cuba, a response to the partial relaxation of certain embargo restrictions, explained José Raúl Perales, Senior Program Associate of the Latin American Program. This has been particularly true within the agriculture and tourism industries. For instance, in 2000 the United States implemented the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act; in the following eight years bilateral agricultural trade and farm sales more than tripled. Furthermore, since 2003, the United States has supplied annually more agricultural products to Cuba than any other nation; from 2003 to 2008 an estimated 35 percent of Cuba’s agricultural imports came from the United States. In terms of tourism, it is estimated that, by eliminating current restrictions on U.S. travel to Cuba, the island nation could expect 500,000 to one million tourism-related U.S. visits per annum. This would not only be a boost to the U.S. travel industry, it would also fundamentally transform the landscape of the entire Caribbean tourism industry. These data hint at the many benefits to a deeper U.S. Cuban economic relationship.

#### Seed vault solves any crop loss

Magness 7/10- reporter (Judy, “Arctic Seed Vault Preserves the World’s Agricultural Supply”, The Suit, July 10th, 2013, <http://www.thesuitmagazine.com/technology/science/22006-arctic-seed-vault-preserves-the-worlds-agricultural-supply.html)//SQR>

\*Svalgrad, Norway – every seed known to humankind is placed in this vault – used if agriculture collapses

In the Arctic Ocean, about 800 miles from the North Pole and midway to mainland Norway is the Svalbard archipelago, a remote island cluster, two-thirds of which is covered with glaciers. Built into the mountainside on the remote island of Spitsbergen sits what Time Magazine deemed one of the best inventions of 2008. Dubbed “Noah’s Ark for Seeds,” “The Fort Knox of Food” and also a more ominous “Doomsday Vault,” these are the most popular nicknames tossed around by the media. Officially, its name is the Svalbard Global Seed Vault – and it is a fortress, built specifically for protecting and housing the world’s largest collection of humankind's smallest, but most important agricultural assets – seeds. The concept of the Svalbard Global Seed Vault (SGSV) is often compared to that of a safe deposit box in a bank. The Norwegian government, which fully funded the $9 million construction project owns the building – just as a bank owns its building. Depositors from over 1,500 seed banks around the world own the seeds they deposit; no one else has access to any other depositor’s seeds but the depositor. These individual seed banks send duplicates of the seed samples in their collections to the Vault for safe storage. Every single seed in Svalbard is therefore considered a back-up for these native seed collections, garnered from the world’s crops. The Vault is managed by three entities: the Global Crop Diversity Trust, an independent international organization whose mission it is “to ensure the conservation and availability of crop diversity for food security worldwide”; the Nordic Genetic Resource Center (NordGen), “a Nordic organization dedicated to the safeguarding and sustainable use of plants, farm animals and forest lands”; and the Government of Norway. Governments around the world are among the primary sources of funding for the Trust, along with private organizations, including The Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. Name a seed and chances are it’s in the Vault, which according to the Trust, holds over 700,000 samples from almost every country in the world. The need for such extravagant measures to safeguard the world’s seed collections is two-fold. First, climate change, along with increases in world population are challenging current agricultural production, creating a need for new varieties of crops. Second, while there are over 1,500 seed banks around the world doing due diligence to protect their native plant collections, scientists and conservationists have long been concerned about the vulnerability of these institutions to the ravages of weather, war, poor management and lack of funding. Should the contents of their collection be destroyed for any reason, the native crops could possibly face extinction in a crisis. The Trust describes the Svalbard Global Seed Vault – located in the town of Longyearbyen, the largest settlement in the Svalbard archipelago – as a “fail-safe, state-of-the-art seed storage facility that has been built to stand the test of time – and survive natural disasters.” Opening in 2008, construction of the Vault took eight months which is a remarkable achievement, considering the environment, operational logistics and the unique design of the facility. All construction materials and building equipment, for instance, had to be delivered to the Arctic by ship or plane, including giant machinery capable of tunneling into the mountainside. The engineering and security surrounding the Vault is also fascinating. “The world has trusted the Vault with its seeds, and all possible measures to keep the seeds safe in the Vault have been taken,” according to the Trust. For starters, polar bears are on point 24/7 roaming the area – somewhat akin to a natural team of security guards. “Anyone seeking access to the seeds themselves has to pass through four locked doors: the heavy steel entrance doors, a second door approximately 115 meters down the tunnel and finally the two doors to the Vault rooms. Keys are coded to allow access to different levels of the facility. No single key unlocks all of the doors.” While there is no daily staff on-site (aside from the polar bears), local officials use motion detectors, electronic surveillance and NordGen representatives visit the Vault regularly to check in new seed shipments and to monitor the facility. While the seed Vault is not considered high on the list of targets for terrorist attacks, preventative measures in addition to the secured facility are being taken, including airport x-ray screenings of seed shipments, checking for explosives. Besides engineering and security attributes of the Svalbard Global Seed Vault, there are many reasons why the Arctic environment is an optimum location for preservation. Built into the mountain at 430 ft. above sea level to keep the area dry, the interior of the mountain provides superior insulation, low humidity and no detectable radiation. According to the Trust, “Permafrost (permanently frozen subsoil) and thick rock ensure that even in the case of a power outage, the seed samples will remain frozen. The Vault can therefore be considered the ultimate insurance policy for the world’s food supply. It will secure for centuries, millions of seeds representing every important crop variety available in the world today.”

**Appeasement now.**

**Investor News 11/21,** 2013, “Obamalateral Disarmament — U.S. To Cut ICBM Squadron,” http://news.investors.com/ibd-editorials/112113-680264-obama-planning-to-close-icbm-squadron.htm)//DR. H

Defense: Breaking yet another promise, this one to Congress, the administration jeopardizes our national security with plans to eliminate an entire squadron of intercontinental ballistic missiles and destroy its silos.

Yet another example of what President Obama meant in 2012 when he promised Russian President Dmitry Medvedev at the Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul, South Korea, that after his re-election he would have more "flexibility" on defense issues, comes on the news that an ICBM squadron would be scrapped to comply with the New START Treaty — even as both the Russians and Chinese deploy new ballistic missiles.

A document prepared by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and obtained by the Washington Free Beacon maps out a strategy to eliminate an ICBM squadron — and destroy its missile silos — by Dec. 5, 2017.

The military would begin removing ICBMs next October, after an environmental assessment is complete, and the silo elimination would begin in May 2016.

The fact is, as the Heritage Foundation notes, the U.S. does not need to eliminate an ICBM squadron to meet New START's limits. The State Department's Oct. 1 fact sheet says the U.S. must dismantle 109 of its deployed ICBMs, deployed submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and deployed heavy bombers, and remove another 138 warheads.

Heritage notes the U.S. has already reduced its deployed warheads by 112 and that destroying an ICBM squadron to comply with New START is unnecessary.

Further cuts, if needed, could be made by removing the missiles and placing the silos in reserve status.

The document says the reductions are necessary to "meet the New START Treaty compliance date by closing an ICBM squadron and eliminating the associated Launch Facilities." But that's not true. New START does not require destruction of the silos.

So why the unnecessary move to cut our offensive missile deterrent force after the administration has scrapped Phase IV of our European-based missile defense, which was the proposed replacement for the ground-based interceptors and missile radars that were scuttled in a betrayal of our Polish and Czech allies?

The president has said he dreams of a world without nuclear weapons, which critics point out seems to mean only a world without U.S. nukes.

He sees U.S. military supremacy as an anachronistic example of the American exceptionalism for which he has apologized so many times.

To that end, in his June 2013 Berlin speech, President Obama spoke of his desire to unilaterally reduce deployed U.S. nuclear forces by up to one-third.

**Obama’s appeasing Cuba now**

**Diaz-Balart ‘12** (Rep. Mario Diaz-Balart represents the 21st congressional district in South Florida; August 21, 2012; “Mario Diaz-Balart: Obama has Pursued Policy Appeasement”; Fox News Latino; http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/politics/2012/08/21/mario-diaz-balart-obama-has-pursued-policy-appeasement-toward-castro-regime/)

These compliments – and the fact that they were not disavowed by the White House – come as no surprise, given President Obama’s appeasing stance regarding anti-American totalitarian regimes. Since he took office in January 2009, President Obama has pursued a policy of appeasement toward the totalitarian Cuban dictatorship. Despite the Castro brothers’ harboring of international terrorists and their increasingly relentless oppression of the Cuban people, President Obama weakened U.S. sanctions and has increased the flow of dollars to the dictatorship. In response, the Castro brothers amped up their repression of the Cuban people and imprisoned American humanitarian aid worker Alan Gross for the “crime” of taking humanitarian aide to Cuba’s small Jewish community. Clearly, President Obama is not concerned about the threat posed by the Cuban dictatorship, nor has he manifested genuine solidarity with the pro-democracy aspirations of the Cuban people. - U.S. Rep. Mario Diaz-Balart, R-Fla. The Cuban people are protesting in the streets and demanding freedom. But rather than supporting the growing, courageous pro-democracy movement, President Obama instead has chosen to appease their oppressors. While President Obama claims that his policies aim to assist the oppressed Cuban people, his actions betray that he is not on their side. You cannot credibly claim to care about the oppressed while working out side deals with their oppressors and welcoming the oppressors’ elite into the United States with open arms. And you cannot claim to support political prisoners while increasing the flow of dollars to their jailers. The failures of the Obama administration in Cuba are not an isolated foreign policy failure. Around the world, President Obama has taken an approach of appeasement when it comes to some of our most virulent enemies. In addition to Cuba, from Iran to Syria to Venezuela, President Obama has shown an unwillingness to stand firm when anti-American forces threaten our interests, and his weakness has emboldened America’s enemies. If we are going to reassert our position in the world, we need a change at the top.

**Appeasement good**

**Record 8**(Jeffrey, defense policy critic and teaches strategy at the Air War College in Montgomery, Alabama, Summer 2008, “Retiring Hitler and ‘Appeasement’ from the National Security Debate,” <http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/Articles/08summer/record.pdf>) jy

Appeasement, which became a politically charged term only after¶ World War II, actually means “to pacify, quiet, or satisfy, especially by giving¶ in to the demands of,” according to Webster’s New World Dictionary and Thesaurus, which goes on to list synonyms including “amends, settlement, reparation, conciliation, and compromise.”13 These terms are consistent with what¶ most historians and international relations theorists understand to be the phe¶ nomenon of appeasement: states seeking to adjust or settle their differences by¶ measures short of war. Theorist Stephen Rock defines appeasement as simply¶ “the policy of reducing tensions with one’s adversary by removing the causes¶ of conflict and disagreement,”14 a definition echoed by political scientists¶ Gordon Craig and Alexander George: “the reduction of tension between [two¶ states] by the methodical removal of the principal causes of conflict and disagreement between them.”15 Thus Richard Nixon was guilty of “appeasing”¶ Communist China in 1972 by embracing Beijing’s one-China policy, and Ronald Reagan was guilty of “appeasing” the Soviet Union in 1987 by resolving¶ tensions with Moscow over actual and planned deployments of intermediaterange nuclear forces in Europe.¶ Unfortunately, Anglo-French behavior toward Nazi Germany gave¶ appeasement such a bad name that the term is no longer usable except as a political pejorative. Before Munich, however, observes historian Paul Kennedy,¶ “the policy of settling international . . . quarrels by admitting and satisfying¶ grievances through rational negotiation and compromise, thereby avoiding¶ the resort to an armed conflict which would be expensive, bloody, and possibly very dangerous” was generally viewed as “constructive, positive, and¶ honorable.”16 Five years after World War II, Winston Churchill, the great¶ anti-appeaser of Hitler, declared, “Appeasement in itself may be good or bad¶ according to the circumstances. Appeasement from weakness and fear is¶ alike futile and fatal.” He added, “Appeasement from strength is magnanimous and noble, and might be the surest and only path to world peace.”17¶ An oft-cited case of successful appeasement from a position of¶ strength is Great Britain’s resolution of disputes with the United States from¶ 1896 to1903.18 By the 1890s the number and power of Britain’s enemies were¶ growing. Britain had no great-power allies and faced rising challenges from¶ Germany and Russia coupled with continuing tensions with France and the¶ United States. Tensions with industrially expanding and increasingly bellicose Germany became especially acute when in 1898 Berlin gratuitously¶ moved to challenge British naval supremacy in European waters. Accordingly, Britain decided to reduce the potential demands on its military power¶ by resolving outstanding disputes with the United States and France. With respect to the United States, it agreed to American demands that Britain explicitly accept the Monroe Doctrine; submit British Guiana’s border dispute with¶ Venezuela to international arbitration; agree to US construction, operation,¶ and fortification of an interoceanic canal through Central America; and settle¶ an Alaskan-Canadian border dispute in America’s favor. None of these concessions involved vital British security interests, which in fact were advanced¶ by transforming the world’s greatest industrial power from a potential enemy¶ into a friend (and later indispensable ally). Accepting US dominance within¶ the Western Hemisphere not only laid the foundation of American entry on¶ Britain’s side in World War I; it also permitted a British naval evacuation of¶ the hemisphere for operations in European waters.¶Meaning of the Word¶ Use of the Munich analogy not only twists the meaning of appeasement; it also ignores the extraordinary nature of the Nazi German threat.¶ Though the analogy’s power to persuade is undeniable, Nazi Germany remains without equal as a state threat. Genuinely Hitlerian security threats to¶ the United States have not been replicated since 1945. The scope of Hitler’s¶ nihilism, recklessness, military power, and territorial-racial ambitions posed¶ a mortal threat to western civilization, and there was nothing inevitable about¶ his ultimate defeat. No other authoritarian or totalitarian regime ever employed such a powerful military instrument in such an aggressive manner on¶ behalf of such a monstrous agenda. Hitler was simultaneously unappeasable¶ and undeterrable—a rare combination that made war the only means of bringing him down. He understood that he could not achieve his international¶ ambitions without war, and no territorial or political concessions the democracies might offer him would ever be enough.

**Budget deal.**

**UPI, 12/1**/13(“Immigration reform to play second-fiddle to budget this winter”

Read more: <http://www.upi.com/Top_News/US/2013/12/01/Immigration-reform-to-play-second-fiddle-to-budget-this-winter/UPI-73801385923737/#ixzz2miHoBDOk>)

A Republican U.S. congressman said Sunday that movement on immigration reform is unlikely this winter until a new budget is passed.

Rep. Tom Cole, R-Okla., said on ABC's "This Week" that the budget was the top priority issue on Capitol Hill and immigration reform was on the back burner for now.

"Not until we get a budget done," Cole said. "Literally I think the most important thing right now is to make sure we don't have a government shutdown, to make sure that we deal with the debt ceiling."

Cole said a shutdown was unlikely at this point, but he acknowledged a spending plan will require a long process.

"Around here, we can't walk and chew gum," said Cole. "Let's just chew gum for a little while. And right now, chewing gum is getting a budget deal and making sure that we don't default when the debt ceiling comes around."

**GOP divisions.**

**Mascaro, 11/29**/13(Lisa, Los Angeles Times, “GOP promise of immigration reform fades a year after election”

<http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-immigration-gop-20131130,0,3679179.story#ixzz2miIKGPQE>)

Changing the way the party talks about immigration is about all House Republicans have to show for their efforts over the last 11 months — and even that effort has notable exceptions.

Though Speaker John A. Boehner of Ohio has insisted recently that immigration reform is not dead, the House is about to finish the year without progress on a topic that is a priority to Latino voters, an electorate the GOP desperately needs to woo before the next presidential race.

In fact, the House's most visible immigration-related action was a measure to defund an Obama administration program to defer deportations of young immigrants, a vote that increased Latino animosity even though it failed to become law.

The legislative sputter stems from Republicans' focus on the 2014 midterm election. As lawmakers burnish their conservative credentials for potential hard-right primary challenges, they are betting they will have time to court Latinos before the 2016 election.

But the inaction raises questions about whether Republicans have learned from their electoral losses last year and can broaden the party's base to appeal to more minorities. And it's not only immigration reform. GOP promises to be more inclusive to women and gays also have produced few results.

"It's foolhardy," said Alex Nowrasteh, a policy analyst at the libertarian-leaning Cato Institute. "On the one hand, Republicans have improved their rhetoric and they've moved much more toward embracing immigration reform. On the other hand, immigration reform was passed in the Senate and was dropped in the House of Representatives, and that makes them look like they're opposed to reform, which in a way, they are."

In last year's presidential election, Mitt Romney — whose comment about "self-deportation" infuriated immigration advocates — lost the Latino vote by a 44-percentage-point margin, the largest deficit of any Republican presidential candidate since the Clinton era. Alarmed GOP insiders jump-started congressional talks toward a bipartisan immigration overhaul, and Boehner announced the time had come for Congress to act.

But the speaker has refused to take up the Senate's sweeping bipartisan overhaul of immigration laws, even though it would probably pass the House with Democratic support; nor are House Republicans expected to vote on their own measures any time soon.

Divisions within the House GOP have left the party at a standstill. More Republican lawmakers than ever — nearly two dozen, by some counts — support the cornerstone of an immigration overhaul, which is a path to citizenship for immigrants in the U.S. illegally.

But many more oppose legalization efforts. Most House Republicans represent conservative districts, configured to include few minority voters. The handful of exceptions, including several from California, have already come under pressure in their districts, but most have little interest in the subject.

"There's just no cohesion there yet," said Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.), who has tried to persuade Republicans to take action. "All I hope is that they realize that the issue is not going away — that we need to act on it — that we'd be glad to consider any proposals or ideas they have."

Hedging the political risks, House GOP leaders continue working behind the scenes with lawmakers to draft a series of bills that could be brought forward next year.

Together, they would resemble the main ingredients of the comprehensive Senate bill.

One, from Majority Leader Eric Cantor of Virginia, would provide a path to citizenship for young people brought to the U.S. illegally as minors. Another would allow adult immigrants to apply for legal status as border security is ramped up.

President Obama has extended a hand to Boehner several times by saying he would be open to the House GOP's piecemeal approach rather than the Senate's big package.

"It's Thanksgiving; we can carve that bird into multiple pieces," Obama said during a speech in San Francisco on Monday. "A drumstick here, breast meat there. But as long as all the pieces get done — soon — and we actually deliver on the core values we've been talking about for so long, I think everybody is fine with it."

House Republicans, though, have resisted most White House initiatives. Many Republicans prefer to use the months ahead investigating what went wrong with the healthcare law. And some House members seem to have missed the memo on new talking points.

**No cyberterror.**

**Libicki, 8/16** - Senior Management Scientist at the RAND Corporation and a Visiting Professor at the U.S. Naval Academy (Martin C., "Don't Buy the Cyberhype," Foreign Affairs, 8-16-13, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139819/martin-c-libicki/dont-buy-the-cyberhype?page=show, SMS)

These days, most of Washington seems to believe that a major cyberattack on U.S. critical infrastructure is inevitable. In March, James Clapper, U.S. director of national intelligence, ranked cyberattacks as the greatest short-term threat to U.S. national security. General Keith Alexander, the head of the U.S. Cyber Command, recently characterized “cyber exploitation” of U.S. corporate computer systems as the “greatest transfer of wealth in world history.” And in January, a report by the Pentagon’s Defense Science Board argued that cyber risks should be managed with improved defenses and deterrence, including “a nuclear response in the most extreme case.” Although the risk of a debilitating cyberattack is real, the perception of that risk is far greater than it actually is. No person has ever died from a cyberattack, and only one alleged cyberattack has ever crippled a piece of critical infrastructure, causing a series of local power outages in Brazil. In fact, a major cyberattack of the kind intelligence officials fear has not taken place in the 21 years since the Internet became accessible to the public. Thus, while a cyberattack could theoretically disable infrastructure or endanger civilian lives, its effects would unlikely reach the scale U.S. officials have warned of. The immediate and direct damage from a major cyberattack on the United States could range anywhere from zero to tens of billions of dollars, but the latter would require a broad outage of electric power or something of comparable damage. Direct casualties would most likely be limited, and indirect causalities would depend on a variety of factors such as whether the attack disabled emergency 911 dispatch services. Even in that case, there would have to be no alternative means of reaching first responders for such an attack to cause casualties. The indirect effects might be greater if a cyberattack caused a large loss of confidence, particularly in the banking system. Yet scrambled records would probably prove insufficient to incite a run on the banks.

#### Plan is politically popular and it’s perceived as a win

**Hinderdael 11** M.A. candidate at SAIS Bologna Center, concentrating in American Foreign Policy and Energy, Resources, and Environment [Klaas Hinderdael, Breaking the Logjam: Obama's Cuba Policy and a Guideline for Improved Leadership, by <http://bcjournal.org/volume-14/breaking-the-logjam.html?printerFriendly=true>]

Political Implications¶ In the wake of a markedly diminished strategic threat from the Cuban island after the end of the Cold War, domestic political goals trumped other goals in terms of setting Cuba policy, particularly during election years. Nonetheless, legislative momentum for engaging Cuba has picked up decidedly, even as some presidents have lagged behind. This momentum has coincided with a slow shift in public opinion and demographics that make ending the embargo and engaging Cuba popular amongst both the majority of American voters, as well as the majority of the Cuban-American constituency.¶ Two events in the late 1990s have often been pointed to as significant turning points in the political views and weight of Cuban-American voters. First, many traveled to Cuba for the 1998 papal visit, and embraced Pope John Paul II’s call for “Cuba to open to the world, and the world to open to Cuba.”40 then, two years later, the Elián González episode of 2000 allowed for a shift dubbed by Daniel Erikson the “Elián meets the China syndrome.”41 With the majority of Americans calling for Elián to be reunited with his father in Cuba, a position that anti-Castro Cuban-Americans opposed vehemently, the Cuban-American community, by taking such a hard-line stance, lost some of its legitimacy in the American political system. Furthermore, a harsh Cuba policy stood in stark contrast to a simultaneous broadening of America’s economic and diplomatic ties with China.¶ Polls over the last decade have revealed the dramatic shift in the views of Cuban-Americans. They indicate that, while in 1997, only 22 percent of Miami-Dade County Cuban-Americans favored ending the embargo, by 2004, that percentage had risen to 34 percent, and by December 2008 to 55 percent (in 2008, 65 percent also supported ending restrictions on travel and remittances).42 these statistics indicate that Obama’s positions in the run-up to the 2008 presidential election may not have been such a bad political strategy after all. Furthermore, we should expect to see politicians increasingly catering to these beliefs as they continue to gain political expediency.¶ Perhaps more significantly, Americans on both sides of the political spectrum support significant changes in Cuba policy, from relaxing travel and remittance restrictions to opening up diplomatic relations. They also believe that the island provides little threat to the United States, and that engagement is the most likely policy to lead Cuba towards democratic reform. An April 2009 World Public opinion poll drew the following conclusions from republican (r) and Democrat (D) pollsters:43¶ In terms of the US embargo policy, just days before the World Public opinion poll was released, separate Gallup and ABC polls showed that approximately 55 percent of Americans believe the embargo should be ended, with 35 percent believing it should be continued, and the rest unsure.44 Due to such strong public support for a shift in Cuba policy, the risks of making a drastic shift in the country’s Cuba policies are decreasing rapidly. **Leaders willing to promote such a transformation stand to reap significant political gains.¶** A steady demographical shift in the Cuban-American population also makes such a stance politically pragmatic. As experts have noted, first generation Cuban-Americans, traditionally more linked to Cuba policy hardliners, “are retreating from the political stage, if for no reason other than age.”45 In contrast, later-generation immigrants are no longer single-issue voters, made particularly evident during the 2008 election, as the majority of Cuban-American voters agreed with Obama’s Cuba policy, but still voted for Senator John McCain.¶ In fact, Florida International University (FIU) polls show that on a variety of issues, including ending restrictions on remittances and travel, ending the embargo, and reestablishing diplomatic relations, there is a 15 to 20 percent hike in support for these policies among those who immigrated between 1980 and 1998, as opposed to earlier immigrants. There is an additional increase of 5 percent for those who came to America after 1998.46 Clearly, as these demographics continue to provide rising support for engagement and ending the embargo, politicians should and will attempt to shift Cuba policy accordingly.¶ Nonetheless, while the above views do provide increasing political clout, one cannot discard the historical significance of election year Florida politics. During his campaign, President Bush repeatedly condemned the June 2000 seizure of Elián González and made it clear that “he intended to confront [Fidel] Castro.”47 Harsh anti-Castro rhetoric ultimately helped Bush win the election, as he won 80 percent of the Cuban-American vote and the state of Florida by only 537 votes.48¶ In the aftermath of the 2000 presidential election, it is inevitable that candidates continue to fear alienating a strong voting bloc in a key swing state. Similarly, republican campaign finance money going into Democratic coffers bolsters the status quo and prevents policy modifications.49 Florida can still determine an election, but candidates should note the weakening correlation between the voting patterns of Cuban-Americans and the Cuba policies touted by politicians, as well as the demographical changes that have taken place since 2000.¶ Ultimately, public support amongst Americans as a whole, as well as Cuban-Americans in particular, shows that pragmatism is winning, and that the majority prefers engagement over isolation. More recently, Raúl’s reforms are also providing domestic momentum for a transformation of US-Cuba policy. **Forward-looking American leaders will see these shifts and take advantage of the political gains that they provide by ending the embargo and normalizing relations with Cuba**.

**Fights are key to passage.**

**Dickerson 13** (John, Slate, Go for the Throat!, www.slate.com/articles/news\_and\_politics/politics/2013/01/barack\_obama\_s\_second\_inaugural\_address\_the\_president\_should\_declare\_war.single.html)

On Monday, President Obama will preside over the grand reopening of his administration. It would be altogether fitting if he stepped to the microphone, looked down the mall, and let out a sigh: so many people expecting so much from a government that appears capable of so little. A second inaugural suggests new beginnings, but this one is being bookended by dead-end debates. Gridlock over the fiscal cliff preceded it and gridlock over the debt limit, sequester, and budget will follow. After the election, the same people are in power in all the branches of government and they don't get along. There's no indication that the president's clashes with House Republicans will end soon. Inaugural speeches are supposed to be huge and stirring. Presidents haul our heroes onstage, from George Washington to Martin Luther King Jr. George W. Bush brought the Liberty Bell. They use history to make greatness and achievements seem like something you can just take down from the shelf. Americans are not stuck in the rut of the day. But this might be too much for Obama’s second inaugural address: After the last four years, how do you call the nation and its elected representatives to common action while standing on the steps of a building where collective action goes to die? That bipartisan bag of tricks has been tried and it didn’t work. People don’t believe it. Congress' approval rating is 14 percent, the lowest in history. In a December Gallup poll, 77 percent of those asked said the way Washington works is doing “serious harm” to the country. **The challenge for** President **Obama’s** speech is the challenge of his **second term:** **how to be great when the environment stinks**. Enhancing the president’s legacy requires something more than simply the clever application of predictable stratagems. Washington’s partisan rancor, the size of the problems facing government, and the limited amount of time before Obama is a lame duck all point to a single conclusion: **The president** who came into office speaking in lofty terms about bipartisanship and cooperation **can only cement** his **legacy** **if he destroys the GOP**. If he wants to transform American politics, **he must go for the throa**t. President Obama could, of course, resign himself to tending to the achievements of his first term. He'd make sure health care reform is implemented, nurse the economy back to health, and put the military on a new footing after two wars. But he's more ambitious than that. He ran for president as a one-term senator with no executive experience. In his first term, he pushed for the biggest overhaul of health care possible because, as he told his aides, he wanted to make history. He may already have made it. There's no question that he is already a president of consequence. But there's no sign he's content to ride out the second half of the game in the Barcalounger. He is approaching gun control, climate change, and immigration with wide and excited eyes. He's not going for caretaker. How should the president proceed then, if he wants to be bold? The Barack **Obama** of the first administration **might have approached the task by** **finding** some **Republicans to deal with** and then start agreeing to some of their demands in hope that he would win some of their votes. It's the traditional approach. Perhaps he could add a good deal more schmoozing with lawmakers, too. **That's the old way. He** has **abandoned that.** He doesn't think it will work and he doesn't have the time. As Obama explained in his last press conference, he thinks the **Republicans are dead set on opposing him**. **They cannot be unchained by schmoozing**. Even if Obama were wrong about Republican intransigence, other **constraints** will **limit** the chance for **cooperation**. Republican lawmakers worried about primary challenges in 2014 are not going to be willing partners. He probably has at most 18 months before people start dropping the lame-duck label in close proximity to his name. Obama’s only remaining option is to pulverize. Whether he succeeds in passing legislation or not, given his ambitions, his goal should be to delegitimize his opponents. **Through** a series of clarifying **fights over controversial issues, he can force Republicans to** either side with their coalition's most extreme elements or **cause a rift in the party that will leave it**, at least temporarily, **in disarray.**

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#### Piecemeal will still be derailed on the path to citizenship – Obama’s support for piecemeal is only if the House delivers on citizenship

**Nakamura, 11/21/13** (David, “Boehner: Immigration reform ‘absolutely not’ dead in House” Washington Post, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/2013/11/21/boehner-immigration-reform-absolutely-not-dead-in-house/>

At a forum with business executives this week, Obama said of the House approach to immigration: "If they want to chop that thing up into five pieces, as long as all five pieces get done, I don't care what it looks like, as long as it's actually delivering on those core values that we talk about."

Yet the sticking point remains a path to citizenship for the nation's 12 million undocumented immigrants. While the Senate bill would allow most of those immigrants to pursue citizenship over a 13-year period, most House Republicans have not supported such a measure. House committees have deliberated over bills focused on increased border control and tougher laws governing undocumented immigrants.

#### Not enough time left to do piecemeal reform

**Wall Street Journal, 11/20/13** (“Obama Backs Piecemeal Immigration Overhaul” <http://stream.wsj.com/story/latest-headlines/SS-2-63399/SS-2-387090/>)

Many advocates of a broad immigration overhaul have worried that Congress would pass some elements, such as business-backed measures allowing more temporary workers into the country, without setting a path to citizenship for people now in the U.S. illegally, as the Senate bill does. Mr. Obama’s statement was his most extensive about accepting a piecemeal approach.

The president said he was “optimistic” that Congress would meet the goal he set of passing an immigration bill by the end of the year.

But just after Mr. Obama spoke, Rep. Paul Ryan (R., Wis.), chairman of the House Budget Committee, poured cold water on that idea. In his own appearance before The Wall Street Journal CEO Council, Mr. Ryan said there wasn’t enough time left to tackle immigration this year.

#### No uniqueness -- Iran appeasement.

Schwartz 11/25, Sharona, 2013, “There Are A Lot Of People Comparing Obama’s New Iran Deal With A Significant (And Very Bad) Moment In History,” http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2013/11/25/there-are-a-lot-people-comparing-obamas-new-iran-deal-with-a-significant-and-very-bad-moment-in-history/)//DR. H

Both Israeli lawmakers and conservative pundits have compared the deal over Iran’s nuclear program secured in Geneva this weekend with the Munich Agreement of 1938 in which European nations agreed to allow Nazi Germany to annex parts of Czechoslovakia. Of the deal, then British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain declared his infamous phrase, “Peace for our time.” A year later, Adolf Hitler invaded Poland, revealing the folly of Chamberlain and his allies’ appeasement policy.

“Winds of Munich are blowing from Geneva,” Israeli Tourism Minister Uzi Landau told the Jerusalem Post. Right-wing Member of Knesset Moshe Feiglin wrote, “The Iranian version of the Munich Agreement was just signed in Geneva. Like Czechoslovakia in 1938, which was not party to the Western powers’’ discussions that effectively brought about its demise,, Israel today watches from the sidelines as its existential interest is being sacrificed by the West.”

Member of Knesset Ayelet Shaked said, “As Chamberlain said: Everything would have been alright if Hitler hadn’t lied to me.”

Besides the Israeli politicians, an array of conservative American voices has been invoking the words “Munich,” “appeasement” and “Chamberlain” as analogies for the Obama administration’s quest for a deal with Iran, while bloggers have been posting side-by-side photos of the Geneva and Munich meetings and photo-shopped images of Obama and Chamberlain.

“Nothing good happens late at night, and America just had a modern-day Neville Chamberlain moment,” former Congressman Allen West wrote.

“President Obama has just empowered the number one state sponsor of terrorism, Iran, to pursue its nuclear goals and objectives,” West added. “This is not diplomacy, this is abject surrender and appeasement. Iran loses nothing, not a single facility, not any capability to enrich uranium, but we have conceded the one best non-military option: economic sanctions.”

#### Both case studies and quantitative studies disprove your shenanigans.

Huth97Paul, Autumn. Director of Research at CIDCM as well as a professor in the Government and Politics Department at the University of Maryland. “Reputations and Deterrence: a Theoretical and Empirical Assessment,” Security Studies 7.1.

THE NUMBER of studies which have either focused on reputations as an explanatory variable, or treated reputations as one of several causal variables in tests of deterrence theory, is limited. These studies have employed both comparative case-study methods as well as statistical analyses of larger datasets, and the predominant focus has been on reputations for resolve as opposed to reputations for military strength. 20 A number of conclusions can be drawn from these studies: 1) Lack of Support for Schelling. There is weak support for the strong interdependence-of-commitments argument that potential attackers infer reputations for defender states based on the latter's prior behavior in disputes with other states across a broad range of geographic locations. Huth and Russett in their statistical analysis of fifty-four cases of extended deterrence from 1900 to 1980, found that the past behavior of the defender in disputes with other states had no significant impact on deterrence outcomes. 21 Mercer, in his analysis of the Moroccan Crises of 1905 and 1911 as well as the Bosnia-Herzegovina Crisis of 1908—9 did not find a clear or consistent pattern of European leaders inferring reputations from previous crisis outcomes. 22 Ted Hopf, in his study of U.S. foreign policy victories and defeats in the Third World from 1965 to 1990, concluded that Soviet assessments of the credibility of U.S. extended deterrent commitments in Europe and Asia were essentially unaffected by U.S. behavior in the Third World.